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Abstract
Restricting the attention to static games, we consider the problem of ambiguity generated by uncertain values of play-
ers’ payoff functions. Uncertainty is represented by a bounded set of possible realizations, and the level of uncertainty is
parametrized in such a way that zero means no uncertainty, the so-called nominal counterpart game, and one the maximum
uncertainty. Assuming that agents are ambiguity averse and they adopt the worst-case optimization approach to uncertainty,
we employ the robust-optimization techniques to obtain a so-called robust game, see Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006). A robust
game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity in a conservative way. The equilibria of this game are called robust-
optimization equilibria and the existence is guaranteed by standard regularity conditions. The paper investigates the sensitivity
to the level of uncertainty of the equilibrium outputs of a robust game. Defining the opportunity cost of uncertainty as the extra
profit that a player would obtain by reducing his level of uncertainty, keeping fixed the actions of the opponents, we prove
that a robust-optimization equilibrium is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game where the ǫ-approximation
measures the opportunity cost of uncertainty. Moreover, considering an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of a nominal game, we prove that
it is always possible to introduce uncertainty such that the ǫ-Nash equilibrium is a robust-optimization equilibrium. Under
some regularity conditions on the payoff functions, we also show that a robust-optimization equilibrium converges smoothly
towards a Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game, when the level of uncertainty vanishes. Despite these analogies,
the equilibrium outputs of a robust game may be qualitatively different from the ones of the nominal counterpart. An ex-
ample shows that a robust Cournot duopoly model can admit multiple and asymmetric robust-optimization equilibria despite
the nominal counterpart is a simple symmetric game with linear-quadratic payoff functions for which only a symmetric Nash
equilibrium exists.
Keywords: Ambiguity aversion; worst-case optimization; robust games.
1 Introduction
Ambiguity affects the choice of economic agents, as demonstrated in his seminal contribution by Ellsberg (1961). As opposed
to risk, where an objective probability distribution describes some possible occurrence, ambiguity (also known as uncertainty
or Knightian uncertainty, see Knight (1921)) is characterized by the inability of the decision maker to formulate a unique
probability distribution or by his/her lack of trust in any single probability estimate. The experimentally documented attitude
to prefer situations with known probabilities to unknown ones, to the extent that these can be compared, is defined uncertainty
aversion or ambiguity aversion, see Epstein (1999).
In game theory, uncertainty and risk are related to the actions of the opponents as well as to the environment of the game. A
cornerstonemodel that describes the decision mechanisms of players in this context of incomplete information is the Bayesian-
game framework proposed by Harsanyi, see, e.g., Harsanyi (1967), Harsanyi (1968b) and Harsanyi (1968a). It represents a
game-theoretical model to describe how players handle risk in a non-cooperative strategic setting, with objective probabilities
available about the possible realizations of the environment of the game and the actions of the opponents. Nevertheless, this
model does not provide a behavior setting and an equilibrium concept when players are affected by ambiguity, which is essen-
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tial, for example, in discussing the refinement of Nash equilibria or to infer about players’ selection problem among multiple
Nash equilibria, see, e.g., Marinacci (2000), and in mechanism design where a planner does not know agents’ beliefs about
other players’ types as well as the environment of the game, see, e.g. Crémer and McLean (1985) and Bergemann and Morris
(2005). As indicated in Jehiel et al (2006), the sensitivity of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium to agents’ beliefs suggests the use
of more robust (distribution-free) notions of equilibrium for incomplete-information games. A very conservative concept is
the one of ex-post equilibrium, which is a Nash equilibrium under all possible realizations of the uncertain parameters. Intro-
duced in Holmström and Myerson (1983) with the name of uniform incentive compatibility and used for the first time in the
context of auctions in Crémer and McLean (1985), ex-post equilibrium is increasingly studied in game theory, see, e.g., Kalai
(2004), and it is often used in mechanism design as a very robust solution concept, see, e.g., Crémer and McLean (1985) and
Perry and Reny (2002).1
The ex-post equilibrium concept presents several drawbacks. Despite Kalai (2004) shows that an equilibrium of large
games is an ex-post Nash equilibrium, this remains a very conservative distribution-free equilibrium concept and its existence
depends on the structure of the game and on players’ uncertainty. Moreover, a recent literature on interdependence value
environment has obtained positive and negative results using this solution concept, see, e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin (2000)
and Bergemann and Välimäki (2002). Therefore new equilibrium concepts may be useful. The modern decision theory offers
many models to describe the behavior of agents under ambiguity aversion, see Gilboa and Marinacci (2016) for a recent survey
on the topic. The most famous ones are the Choquet expected utility model proposed in Schmeidler (1989) and the maxmin
expected utility model introduced in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The Choquet expected utility model accommodates the
different degrees of confidence in one’s own probability assignments or beliefs that a decision maker can experience. The
model employs non-additive probabilities to represent uncertainty aversion. The maxmin expected utility model, followed by
Maccheroni et al (2006) and others, captures the idea that an agent has beliefs about the state of the world represented by a set
of probability distribution functions and he/she maximizes with respect to the minimum expected value taken over the possible
probabilities.
In light of these developments in decision theory, alternative approaches to uncertainty have been proposed in game theory.
Considering uncertainty about opponent agents’ actions, Marinacci (2000) introduces the ambiguous games, a modification
of the normal form game that allows the presence of vagueness in players’ beliefs over the opponents’ choice of strategies.
In ambiguous games, players’ behavior is expressed through a Choquet expected utility model where non-additive probability
measures reflect the ambiguity aversion of agents. The model is flexible and distinguishes pessimistic players that, in the
presence of ambiguity, emphasize the lower payoffs, and optimistic players that instead emphasize the higher ones. Different
is instead the uncertainty about the environment of a game, which implies partial knowledge by players of their own payoff
function. In the simplest case the payoff function depends on some parameters, the values of which are unknown. A player
may have some ambiguous knowledge about the probability distribution of the uncertain parameters, for example he/she
knows that the parameters with unknown values are drawn according to a set of possible probability distributions, or he/she
may know that the possible realization of the uncertain parameters are described by deterministic sets. In an attempt to
describe the uncertainty aversion of agents, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axiomatized a choice model, the maxmin expected
utility model mentioned above, which mirrors in the soft robust-optimization technique when uncertainty is represented by
ambiguous knowledge about the probability distribution of the parameters with unknown values, see Ben-Tal et al (2009), and
in the particular case of robust-optimization when parameters with unknown values are described by deterministic sets, see
Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1998). Adopting the soft robust-optimization approach, an agent maximizes his guaranteed expected
payoff, a measure of robustness against distributional variation, while in the robust-optimization approach an agent maximizes
its guaranteed payoff. The last one is useful to accommodate bounded uncertainty and it can be seen as a special case of the
previous model, which can be employed also when the possible realizations of the parameters with unknown values are not
bounded.
In a context of bounded-uncertainty about the possible realizations of the values of the parameters of the payoff func-
tions, Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006) and Crespi et al (2017) employ a robust-optimization approach to ambiguity in which
the agents rely on deterministic-set representations of uncertainty instead of ambiguous probabilistic descriptions of the envi-
1In oligopoly games, for example, ex-post solutions are considered in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) where firms handle uncertainty by committing them-
selves to use a specific supply function and determine prices, or quantities, once uncertainty vanishes. Concerning mechanism design, Bergemann and Morris
(2005) looked at mechanisms that implement the social choice correspondence in ex-post equilibrium. Robust mechanism design in income taxation and
public goods is considered instead in Bierbrauer (2009), where an ex-post implementation is adopted in a large economy model of income taxation and public
goods provision under the assumption that the social benefits from public goods provision are a priori unknown.
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ronment of the game. A game where agents are uncertain about the shape of their own payoff function, as well as the ones
of their opponents, and have an ambiguity aversion expressed by the robust-optimization approach to uncertainty, is denoted
robust game. The robust-game framework offers a distribution-free equilibrium concept, known as robust-optimization equi-
librium. It is a distribution-free equilibrium concept and it is less conservative than the ex-post equilibrium concept, in fact
the first one implies the second one but not the vice versa, see Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006). The advantages are an exis-
tence theorem, computational methods offered by the robust-optimization techniques developed in the last two decades, see,
e.g., Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1998) and Ben-Tal et al (2009), and theoretical results showing the relations with other equilib-
rium concepts in game theory. Regarding this last aspect, in Crespi et al (2017) it has been shown that a robust-optimization
equilibrium is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game, that is of the game without uncertainty.
The aim of the current paper is to measure the sensitivity of the equilibrium outputs of a robust game with respect to
uncertainty. This is a relevant aspect in forecasting the result of a game and in policy analysis as players have a subjective
perception and representation of uncertainty and an erroneous specification of this uncertainty is possible. In this respect, the
contribution of the current paper is new and alternative to the previous ones that are mainly focused on studying the output
of a game once the uncertainty is specified. To study the sensitivity to uncertainty, a new modeling framework is proposed
where uncertainty is characterized by the shape of the uncertainty set and by the level of uncertainty. This representation of
the uncertainty set is crucial to study the effect of the ambiguity aversion. By focusing on the sensitivity towards the level
of uncertainty, the theoretical insights underline that the equilibrium output of a robust game is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the
nominal counterpart game. Moreover, the ǫ waiver of an extra payoff required to play an ǫ-Nash equilibrium measures the
opportunity cost of uncertainty, or cost of uncertainty aversion. Therefore, the robust optimization equilibria of a robust game
are confined in the set of ǫ-Nash equilibria of the nominal counterpart game. In addition, any ǫ-Nash equilibrium can be seen
as a robust-optimization equilibrium assuming that players are affected by uncertainty in a suitable way. The result provides a
theoretical foundation for the ǫ waiver of an extra payoff required to play an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in terms of opportunity cost
of uncertainty. The theoretical foundation proposed has the advantage of offering a criterion of choice for ǫ-Nash equilibria, in
the sense that a specific characterization of the uncertainty set, in terms of shape and level of uncertainty, is usually consistent
with only a subset of the set of all ǫ-Nash equilibria of a nominal game. Under certain conditions on the payoff functions of
a game, the sensitivity to the level of uncertainty is also characterized in terms of robust-optimization equilibria that converge
smoothly towards Nash equilibria when uncertainty vanishes.
The equilibrium outputs of a robust game are not only sensitive to the level of uncertainty but also to the shape of the
uncertainty set, which are the two ingredients that define the uncertainty of a player. In the spirit of Knight, see Knight (1921),
the level of uncertainty can be interpreted as the amount of confidence that a player has on his/her knowledge of the true values
of the parameters of the payoff function, which is the essential of ambiguitymodeling. On the contrary, the shape of uncertainty
set represents a further degree of freedom offered by the robust games that is not available in other modeling frameworks that
account for ambiguity in a context of strategic interaction. This second degree of freedom makes robust games a flexible
modeling framework, able to replicate complicated equilibrium configurations with very simple modeling assumptions. In
fact, for certain shapes of the uncertainty sets and assuming a sufficiently high level of uncertainty, the equilibrium outputs
of a robust game may be qualitatively different from the ones of the nominal counterpart game. Special equilibrium outputs
can be obtained even by simple geometric configurations of the uncertainty sets. A robust version of the Cournot duopoly
model as in Singh and Vives (1984), underlines that uncertainty, in the form of a simple uncertainty set, leads to multiple
robust-optimization equilibria, while the nominal version of the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the Nash
equilibrium is symmetric, the firms produce the same output, while the set of robust-optimization equilibria includes also
asymmetric equilibrium outputs. The multiple robust-optimization equilibria arise thanks to non monotonic decreasing best-
reply functions, which is a feature that can be observed in a nominal game only by assuming complicated payoff functions.
See the stream of research that sparked after the seminal contribution in Rand (1978). In this respect, the example underlines
the modeling flexibility offered by robust games.
The road map of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic concepts of robust game theory. Section 3 provides
existence results for robust-optimization equilibria. Section 4 introduces the concept of opportunity cost of uncertainty and
contains the main theoretical insights on robust games. A simple example is providedwhere a symmetric two-player gamewith
linear-quadratic payoff function depending on a parameter with unknown value can generate multiple and asymmetric robust-
optimization equilibria, where only one of the many converges smoothly to a Nash equilibrium (it has a Nash equilibrium
counterpart). Section 5 introduces a robust version of a duopoly model similar to the one in Singh and Vives (1984) and
provides results about the existence of robust-optimization equilibria. Section 6 concludes and provides indications for future
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research directions in robust-game theory. Appendix A contains the proofs of the theoretical results in Sections 3 and 4.
Appendix B contains an algorithm to compute the worst-case best reply functions when the uncertainty sets are of polyhedral
shape. Appendix C contains the proofs of the conditions for the existence of the robust-optimization equilibria of the robust
duopoly model in Section 5.
2 Robust games and equilibria
In an incomplete-information game, it is possible to distinguish uncertainty about opponents, considered in the ambiguous
games introduced in Marinacci (2000), and uncertainty about your own payoff function or payoff environment, see, e.g.,
Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006) and Crespi et al (2017). Considering finite-person, non-cooperative, simultaneous-move, one-
shot games only, we focus on payoff uncertainty and we consider incomplete-information games where payoff functions
depend on some parameters, the values of which are not known in advance. Players are aware of this uncertainty and they have
perfect knowledge of the set of all possible realizations of the uncertain parameters, the so called uncertainty set. Employing
the information about the uncertainty set, each player chooses the action that maximizes his/her own maximum guaranteed
payoff. Such a player is denoted robust player, and a game populated by robust players is called a robust game.
More formally, we assume a finite setN = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players andAi is the action space of player i. SetA = ×ni=1Ai,
we define by fi : W
δi
i ×A→ R the payoff function of player i which is known except for the value of a parameter vectorαi ∈
W δii . Denoted by fi (αi;xi,x−i), the payoff function of a robust player i depends on the realization of the uncertain parameter
vector αi ∈ W
δi
i , on the player i’s action xi ∈ Ai and on the action of his/her opponents x−i ∈ A−i = ×j∈N ;j 6=iAj . Here,
W δii is a deterministic uncertainty set depending on a parameter δi ∈ [0, 1] and defined asW
δi
i = δiUi + (1− δi)α
0
i , where
Ui is a closed and bounded deterministic set representing all possible realizations of the vector parameterαi, whileα
0
i ∈ Ui is
a singleton. According to this setting and given an action profile (xi,x−i), player i’s vagueness about payoff is represented by
the set
¶
fi (αi;xi,x−i)|αi ∈ W
δi
i
©
and δi measures the level of uncertainty, which vanishes when δi = 0 and it is maximum
when δi = 1.
2 Denoting a game without uncertainty a nominal game, the proposed representation of the uncertainty set allows
to define a unique nominal counterpart of a robust game, i.e. the nominal game obtained when maxi∈N δi = 0. This latter
game is called the nominal counterpart of the robust game.3
In a robust game, each player i is ambiguity averse (or uncertainty averse) and determines his/her action xi by maximizing
his/her worst-case payoff function:
ρδii (xi,x−i) , min
αi∈W
δi
i
fi (αi;xi,x−i) (1)
The actions that players undertake by maximizing their worst-case payoff functions are denoted robust-optimization strategies.
In case uncertainty vanishes, the robust-optimization strategies become the well-known Nash strategies.
A robust optimization strategy derives from an extreme form of ambiguity aversion, in the sense that any possible proba-
bility knowledge assigned to a player would not make an action profile less appealing to him/her than the worst-case approach
to uncertainty. This extreme uncertainty attitude may appear paranoid in the sense that it is equivalent to assuming that nature
will choose a realization of the unknown values of the parameters as if to spite the player. This extreme feeling can be, how-
ever, relaxed in the modeling framework here proposed. By interpreting α0i as the real realization of the vector of parameters
and inspired by Knight (1921), the level of uncertainty of a player can be seen as the level of confidence that the player has on
his/her knowledge of the true values of the parameters of the payoff function. Then, the ambiguity aversion of a player can be
measured by his/her level of uncertainty, and despite the worst-case approach to uncertainty, we can assume that a player is
not ambiguity averse by assuming a level of uncertainty equal to zero.
To underline this aspect, note that a worst-case payoff function depends on the level of uncertainty and has the following
property.
2In a generalized version of this model Ui may be a space of probability distributions representing vagueness of player i and α
0
i
a single probability
distribution (in case of absence of vagueness) from which the unknown parameters (parameters with unknown values) of the payoff function are drawn.
3Note that for each robust game defined as in Definition 1 there is a unique nominal counterpart game, i.e. a game with same players, same action space
and same payoff functions but no uncertainty. However, from a nominal game it is possible to define an infinite variety of robust games because infinite are
the possibilities to define the uncertainty sets. Therefore, we avoid the term robust counterpart.
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Property 1. The worst-case payoff functions are such that ρ
δ1i
i (xi,x−i) ≥ ρ
δ2i
i (xi,x−i), for all δ
2
i > δ
1
i , δ
1
i , δ
2
i ∈ [0, 1],
∀ (xi,x−i) ∈ A and ∀i ∈ N .
Assuming that the worst-case payoff functions are well defined, i.e. the minimum of functions fi with respect toαi ∈W
δi
i
exists and is finite for all (xi,x−i) ∈ A, a robust game is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Denoted by
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
, a robust game is a normal form game {Ai, fi : i ∈ N} and an n-tuple¶
W δii
©n
i=1
of uncertainty sets, such that player i possible payoffs related to action (xi,x−i) belong to
¶
fi (αi;xi,x−i)|αi ∈ W
δi
i
©
and he/she maximizes his/her own worst-case payoff function ρδii (xi,x−i).
According to this definition and by defining equivalent two games that have the same players, the same action spaces
and players’ behavior is independent of which of the two games is considered, we have that a robust game is equivalent to
a nominal game when for each player the worst-case payoff function of the robust game coincides with the payoff function
of the nominal game. That is, the robust game
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
is equivalent to the nominal game
¶
Ai, ρ
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
.4
Using this correspondence between a robust game and a nominal game, Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006) and Crespi et al (2017)
introduce the following equilibrium notion for robust games.
Definition 2. A robust-optimization equilibrium (ROE in short) of a robust game
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
is a Nash equilibrium
of the game
¶
Ai, ρ
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
.
3 The existence of a robust-optimization equilibrium
The definition of robust-optimization equilibrium emphasizes the similarities with the Nash equilibria in many respects. In-
deed, once the worst-case payoff functions are derived, searching for a robust-optimization equilibrium of a robust game is
equivalent to searching for a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the same techniques and algorithms can be used. Moreover, the
problem of existence for a robust-optimization equilibrium is equivalent to the problem of existence for a Nash equilibrium.
Specifically, when the usual properties (see, e.g., Nash (1950)) imposed on the payoff functions for the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in a nominal game are satisfied by the worst-case payoff functions of a robust game, then a robust-optimization
equilibrium exists for that robust game.
Theorem 1. Consider a finite-person, non-cooperative, simultaneous-move, one-shot robust game
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
, in
which there is no private information. Assume that Ai is a non-empty, closed, bounded and convex subset of an Euclidean
space for all i ∈ N . Moreover, assume that the game is equivalent to the nominal game
¶
Ai, ρ
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
with the worst-
case payoff functions that are continuous in Ai × A−i, and concave in Ai for every x−i ∈ A−i. Then, a robust-optimization
equilibrium of the robust game
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
exists.
The existence result in Theorem 1 is based on the assumption that the worst-case payoff functions satisfy the usual prop-
erties, that means continuity and concavity. Instead of considering the worst-case payoff functions, the conditions for the
existence of a robust-optimization equilibrium can be imposed directly on the payoff functions that define a robust game.
Assumption 1. Let Ai, with i ∈ N , be subsets of Euclidean spaces. We assume that:
• Ai is a non-empty, closed, bounded, and convex set, for all i ∈ N ;
• Ui ⊂ Rνi is a non-empty, closed, bounded, and convex set, for all i ∈ N , where νi is the number of entries in vector
αi;
• fi are continuous onW
δi
i ×A;
• fi are concave in xi, ∀αi ∈W
δi
i .
These restrictions are imposed hereafter and they ensure that the worst-case payoff functions satisfy the conditions imposed
in Theorem 1 for the existence of a robust-optimization equilibrium.
4Note that for each robust game there is a unique equivalent nominal game, while for each nominal game there are an infinite variety of equivalent robust
games as the same worst-case payoff function can be obtained by different combinations of payoff functions and uncertainty sets.
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Lemma 1. Under the conditions imposed in Assumption 1, for all i ∈ N the following properties hold true:
- ρδii : A→ R is a continuous function;
- ρδii (·,x−i) is concave for every x−i ∈ A−i.
The results in Lemma 1 indicate that the conditions imposed in Assumption 1 are a particular case of the more general
sufficient conditions imposed in Theorem 1 for the existence of a robust-optimization equilibrium. However, the conditions
imposed in Assumption 1 regard directly the elements that define a robust game. Therefore, they allow a direct comparison
with the necessary conditions imposed by the Nash’s Theorem, see Nash (1950) (and Dutang (2013) for a recent survey). The
comparison underlines that the sufficient conditions to impose on the payoff function for the existence of a robust-optimization
equilibrium are stronger than the ones required for the existence of a Nash equilibrium. In fact, the continuity of the payoff
function is also required with respect to the uncertainty set, and the concavity is required for all possible realizations of the
unknown values of the parameters.
The results in Lemma 1, also discussed in Crespi et al (2017) but without a formal proof, indicate therefore that the
restrictions in Assumption 1 are sufficient (but not necessary) to ensure the existence of a robust-optimization equilibrium
as well as a Nash equilibrium for the nominal counterpart game as stated in the following theorem, the proof of which is in
Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Consider a finite-person, non-cooperative, simultaneous-move, one-shot robust game
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
, in
which there is no private information. Under Assumption 1, we have that:
- The robust game has at least a robust-optimization equilibrium;
- All robust games
{
Ai, fi,W
δ
+
i
i : i ∈ N
}
, with δ+i ∈ [0, δi), have a robust-optimization equilibrium.
The second point in Theorem 2 indicates that if a robust game has a robust-optimization equilibrium because the sufficient
conditions imposed in Assumption 1 are satisfied, then reducing the level of uncertainty, the existence of at least a robust-
optimization equilibrium, therefore the existence of the Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game, are guaranteed.
This result does not imply that a robust-optimization equilibrium for a robust game ensures the existence of at least a Nash
equilibrium for the nominal counterpart game, or the existence of at least a robust-optimization equilibrium when the level
of uncertainty shrinks. In fact, the existence of a robust-optimization equilibrium for a robust game that does not satisfy the
conditions in Assumption 1 is also possible, and in this case the nominal counterpart game may not have a Nash equilibrium.
A further remark on the existence of a robust-optimization equilibrium is required. Due to the ambiguity aversion of
players, specifically due to their robust or worst-case attitude towards uncertainty, some possible realizations of the uncertain
parameters may be irrelevant for the robust game. To be precise, let us define the worst-case frontier of an uncertainty setW δii
as that set of values of the unknown parameters that are the worst-case realization of the uncertainty set for at least a given
action profile of players: {
α
∗
i | ∃ (xi,x−i) ∈ A s.t. α
∗
i = arg min
αi∈W
δi
i
fi (αi;xi,x−i)
}
(2)
Then, it is obvious that two robust games that differ for the uncertainty sets only, but the uncertainty sets have the same worst-
case frontiers, are equivalent games according to the definition of equivalent games introduced above. The consequence is that
the two robust games will have the same robust-optimization equilibria and the players will behave exactly in the same way,
whatever the action of the opponents. Moreover, for the existence of a robust-optimization equilibrium it is sufficient that the
conditions in Assumption 1 hold true for the worst-case frontiers of the uncertainty sets only. In other words, the knowledge
of the worst-case frontier is the only information on an uncertainty set which is relevant to characterize a robust game.
4 Foundations and theoretical insights
Uncertainty implies a loss of profit for player i which determines the so-called opportunity cost of uncertainty for player i.5
Given the actions of player i’s opponents, the opportunity cost of uncertainty for players i measures the extra profit that player
5Since in a robust game players are averse to uncertainty and the loss of profit caused by uncertainty depends on this attitude, the opportunity cost of
uncertainty can be interpreted as the cost of aversion to uncertainty.
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i gains if the uncertainty about his/her payoff function vanishes. Therefore, given x−i the vector of actions of player i’s
opponents and let δi be the level of uncertainty for player i, the opportunity cost of uncertainty for player i is
Cδii (x−i) := max
xi∈Ai
ρ0i (xi,x−i)− ρ
0
i
(
x+i (δi) ,x−i
)
; where x+i (δi) ∈ argmax
xi
ρδii (xi,x−i) (3)
According to the definition, for each given set of actions of the opponents, player i’s opportunity cost of uncertainty is
the difference between the payoff player i would obtain by maximizing his/her nominal payoff function and the value of
the nominal payoff function in correspondence of the action that maximizes his/her worst-case payoff function. Consider a
robust game where payoff uncertainty involves player i only, which has a robust-optimization equilibrium and the nominal
counterpart game admits a Nash equilibrium. In the case in which the opponents play their Nash equilibrium strategies and
these strategies do not depend on the action of player i, the opportunity cost of uncertainty for player i represents the loss that
he/she undergoes when a robust-optimization equilibrium is played instead of a Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart
game. More generally, the opportunity cost of uncertainty is not the extra payoff player i obtains in the nominal counterpart
game. In fact, the Nash-equilibrium strategies of player i’s opponents are not independent of player i’s action and, therefore,
of player i’s payoff uncertainty. Moreover, in a robust game where payoff uncertainty involves also player i’s opponents,
player i’s opponents play their robust-optimization strategies rather than their Nash-equilibrium strategies. Therefore, the
opportunity cost of uncertainty for player i is the extra profit he/she obtains when the actions of the opponents are fixed and
his/her uncertainty vanishes.6
4.1 Uncertainty aversion leads to play an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
The opportunity cost of uncertainty does not represent, therefore, the players’ loss of profit when a robust-optimization equi-
librium is played instead of a Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game. This notwithstanding, it links a robust-
optimization equilibrium of a robust game to an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game.
Definition 3. The action profile (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ A is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of game {Ai, fi : i ∈ N}, when for each i ∈ N
fi
(
α
0
i ;x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i
)
≥ fi
(
α
0
i ;xi,x
∗
−i
)
− ǫ ∀xi ∈ Ai (4)
The basic idea behind the notion of ǫ-Nash equilibrium is that a player accepts to play a strategy that is not optimal
with respect to Nash definition, yet he/she will not deviate unless the payoff improvement is greater than ǫ. The following
theorem (see proof in Appendix A) underlines that a robust-optimization equilibrium is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the nominal
counterpart game, where ǫ is the maximum of players’ opportunity costs of uncertainty.
Theorem 3. If (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ A is a robust-optimization equilibrium of the robust game
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
, then
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of its nominal counterpart, with ǫ = max
¶
Cδ11
(
x
∗
−1
)
, . . . , Cδnn
(
x
∗
−n
)©
. Moreover,
for ǫˆ < ǫ, (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is not an ǫˆ-Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game.
Thus, in case of payoff uncertainty, uncertainty-averse players play an ǫ-Nash equilibrium instead of a Nash equilibrium,
where the level of approximation ǫ is the largest of players’ opportunity costs of uncertainty. Moreover, reaching a better
approximation is not possible in the sense that ǫ cannot be smaller than the greatest of the players’ opportunity costs of
uncertainty.
Measuring the level of approximation that can be obtained in a robust game, the opportunity costs of uncertainty vanish
when uncertainty vanishes. Nevertheless, it is not straightforward to determine if and at which speed they shrink when uncer-
tainty reduces. In particular, kept fixed the actions of the opponents, it cannot be stated in general that player i’s opportunity
cost of uncertainty converges to zero when his level of uncertainty does so, i.e. when δi → 0. Moreover, given the actions of
the opponents, it is not clear, for example, if player i’s opportunity cost of uncertainty is monotonically increasing with respect
to its level of uncertainty. This because, given the actions of the opponents x−i, player i’s opportunity cost of uncertainty
depends on δi according to a function not known in general. In fact, player i’s opportunity cost of uncertainty depends on the
6Since the actions of the opponents depend on their level of uncertainty, we have that player i’s opportunity cost of uncertainty depends implicitly on the
level of uncertainty of the opponents.
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robust-optimization strategy played by player i in a robust game where his/her level of uncertainty is δi and the opponents play
the action profile x−i.
There is, however, a class of robust games for which the behavior of the opportunity cost of uncertainty can be characterized
in more detail. In fact, under the further assumption of fi (αi;xi,x−i) concave w.r.t. αi, ∀αi ∈ Ui, ∀ (xi,x−i) ∈ A and
∀i ∈ N , as suggested in Crespi et al (2017), it is possible to construct a function that is linear w.r.t. the parametrized level of
uncertainty and that approximates by excess player i’s opportunity costs of uncertainty. To this aim, define
Ei (xi,x−i) := ρ
0
i (xi,x−i)− ρ
1
i (xi,x−i) ∀i ∈ N (5)
and the function
E¯i (x−i) := max
xi∈Ai
Ei (xi,x−i) ∀i ∈ N (6)
which can be used to construct an approximation by excess of the opportunity cost of uncertainty of player i as indicated in
the following Lemma (see proof in Appendix A).
Lemma 2. Let fi (αi;xi,x−i) be concave w.r.t. αi, ∀αi ∈ Ui and ∀i ∈ N . Then, δiE¯i (x−i) ≥ C
δi
i (x−i) ∀x−i ∈ A−i and
∀i ∈ N .
By definition, an ǫ1-Nash equilibrium is also an ǫ2-Nash equilibrium as long as ǫ2 ≥ ǫ1. Hence, Lemma 2 implies the
following result.7
Theorem 4 (in Crespi et al (2017)). Let fi (αi;xi,x−i) be concave w.r.t. αi, ∀i ∈ N . If (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ A is a robust-
optimization equilibrium of the robust game
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
, then (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of its nominal
counterpart, with ǫ = max
{
δ1E¯1
(
x
∗
−1
)
, . . . , δnE¯n
(
x
∗
−n
)}
.
Theorem 4 underlines the relationship between a robust-optimization equilibrium of a robust game and an ǫ-Nash equi-
librium of the nominal counterpart game, where ǫ represents an upper bound of players’ opportunity costs of uncertainty.
Differently from the opportunity cost of uncertainty defined in (3), this upper bound is a function that is both linear and strictly
increasing in the level of uncertainty. In fact, by definition ofEi in (5), the function E¯i in (6) does not depend on δi. Therefore,
despite its being based on an upper-bound approximation of the opportunity cost of uncertainty, the result in Theorem 4 can
be useful whenever a closed form expression for the opportunity cost of uncertainty is difficult do obtain. Note that the result
in Theorem 4 can be used instead of the one in Theorem 3 to study the loss of profit derived by uncertainty only when the
payoff functions are concave with respect to the uncertain parameters. In this respect, the scope of Theorem 4 is very large as
players’ payoff functions are linear with respect to the uncertain parameters, therefore concave, in the majority of the games
proposed in the literature.
A further clarification is required for a correct interpretation of Theorems 3 and 4. As already observed, the opportunity cost
of uncertainty does not measure the difference between a player’s profit at the Nash equilibrium and at a robust-optimization
equilibrium. Then, the results in Theorems 3 and 4 do not imply that players’ payoff at a robust-optimization equilibrium are
always lower than at a Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game. Moreover, Theorems 3 and 4 define a relationship
between an ǫ-Nash equilibrium and a robust-optimization equilibrium, but an ǫ-Nash equilibrium is not necessarily a Nash
equilibrium. In particular, an ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium only if that ǫ-Nash equilibrium remains so when
ǫ→ 0, which is not in general the case. In other words, Theorems 3 and 4 do not exclude that uncertainty can create virtuous
configurations such that players are better off with respect to a Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game. A point
that will be underlined and discussed also in the next section where a robust duopoly model is considered.
4.2 An alternative foundation for ǫ-Nash equilibria
The concept of ǫ-Nash equilibrium is more general than the one of Nash equilibrium, in the sense that a Nash equilibrium
is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium but it is not true the vice versa. Hence, the set of ǫ-Nash equilibria of a game does not necessarily
include a Nash equilibrium. The same holds true for robust-optimization equilibria. In fact, Theorems 3 and 4 underline that
the concept of ǫ-Nash equilibrium is more general than the one of robust-optimization equilibrium, i.e. the existence of a
7A proof of Theorem 4 was already proposed in Crespi et al (2017). However, the one here proposed is new, straightforward and elegant and it is obtained
by exploiting a property of ǫ-Nash equilibria as well as Theorem 3, which were not considered in Crespi et al (2017).
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robust-optimization equilibrium of a robust game implies the existence of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart
game. However, the vice versa is not true in general. Hence, a robust game does not necessarily have a robust-optimization
equilibrium, which, in case it exists, it belongs to the set of ǫ-Nash equilibria of the nominal counterpart game. Nevertheless,
as specified in the following Theorem (see proof in Appendix A), for each ǫ-Nash equilibrium of a nominal game, it is possible
to construct a robust game, by choosing suitable payoff-uncertainty sets, such that the first one is the nominal counterpart of
the second one, and the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the nominal game is also a robust-optimization equilibrium of the robust game.
Theorem 5. Consider a nominal game {Ai, fi : i ∈ N}. Then, for each ǫ-Nash equilibrium (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) of this game
there exists at least a robust game such that (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is a robust-optimization equilibrium of the robust game and
{Ai, fi : i ∈ N} is its nominal counterpart.
The game-theory literature motivates players’ waiver of an extra ǫ profit required to have that an ǫ-Nash configuration
is an equilibrium, as an extra cost for searching a better solution or for changing strategy, see, e.g., Dixon (1987). The
result in Theorem 5 provides a further explanation for the existence of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in terms of opportunity cost of
uncertainty. Specifically, for each ǫ-Nash equilibrium, the ǫ profit that players give up when they play an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of uncertainty. As the opportunity cost of uncertainty depends on the worst-case
approach to uncertainty of players, interpreting uncertainty as the lack of trust on the nominal realization, see Knight (1921),
the opportunity cost of uncertainty can also be named cost of ambiguity aversion (or cost of aversion to uncertainty). In
this case, the ǫ profit that players waive when they play an ǫ-Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as the cost of aversion to
uncertainty.
Regarding ǫ-Nash equilibria of a nominal game, the result in Theorem 5 provides therefore a theoretical foundation for
these equilibria in terms of uncertainty aversion. Moreover, it provides a selection criterion to discriminate among ǫ-Nash
equilibria. Indeed, defined an ǫ-level of approximation, these equilibria are not generally unique. In most of the real-world
applications it is the algorithm employed to solve a nominal game and its setting to discriminate the ǫ-Nash equilibrium that
will be considered. Having at least a theoretical justification for the arbitrary choice is a reassuring aspect. In this respect,
Theorem 5 indicates that for the ǫ-approximation chosen and for the ǫ-Nash equilibrium computed, there exists an uncertainty
set, a level of uncertainty and a robust game such that the ǫ-Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a robust-optimization
equilibrium of the game and the ǫ-approximation is the maximum of the opportunity costs of uncertainty (or the maximum of
the costs of aversion to uncertainty) of the players of the robust game.
4.3 An example of robust game and remarks on computing equilibria
Summarizing, a robust-optimization equilibrium of a robust game is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game,
where ǫ measures the opportunity cost of uncertainty. At the same time, each ǫ-Nash equilibrium of a nominal game can be
interpreted as a robust-optimization equilibrium of a robust game that has the first one as its nominal counterpart. Despite
these analogies, there are differences in terms of complexity and methods to adopt when computing an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
of a nominal game and a robust-optimization equilibrium of a robust game. In very large games, the ǫ-Nash equilibria can
be computed using polynomial-time algorithms, while to find a Nash solution requires non-polynomial-time algorithms in
general, see, e.g., Daskalakis and Papadimitriou (2015). Since searching for a robust-optimization equilibrium is equivalent to
finding a Nash equilibrium once the worst-case payoff functions are derived (see again the definition of robust-optimization
equilibrium above), the same computational complexity involves robust-optimization equilibria. In stylized games, on the
contrary, the ǫ-Nash equilibria cannot be computed with general analytical methods, while the robust-optimization equilibria
can be computed employing standard techniques used for searching Nash equilibria in nominal games. For example, it is
possible to construct the worst-case (or robust) best-reply functions, which are the robust counterpart of best-reply functions
and are defined as follows, see Crespi et al (2017):
Rδii (x−i) = arg max
xi∈Ai
[
min
αi∈W
δi
i
fi (αi;xi,x−i)
]
(7)
These functions can be used to identify the robust-optimization equilibria. In fact, the action profile (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ A is a
robust-optimization equilibrium if and only if
x∗i ∈ R
δi
i
(
x
∗
−i
)
∀i ∈ N (8)
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If the worst-case best-reply functions can be used to compute robust-optimization equilibria of a robust game, their derivation
may not be so straightforward as it is for the best-reply functions of a nominal game. To overcome the issue, a simple procedure
is proposed in Appendix B to derive players’ worst-case best-reply functions when the uncertainty sets are polyhedra, which
is a common assumption in robust-optimization. The algorithm is used to obtain the worst-case best-reply functions in the
example that follows. The example regards a simple robust game where players’ payoff functions are linear-quadratic and
depend on a single unknown parameter.
Example 1. Consider the finite-person, non-cooperative, simultaneous-move, one-shot robust game
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ {1, 2}
©
,
where
• The action spaces are Ai := [0, 1.8] ⊂ R, for i = 1, 2;
• The uncertainty sets areW δii := δiUi + (1− δi)α
0
i = δi [0.1, 0.8] + (1− δi) 0.6 ⊂ R, for i = 1, 2.
• The level of uncertainty is the same for both players, i.e. δ1 = δ2 = δ.
• The payoff functions are fi (αi;xi,x−i) := (1 + αi (1− xi)− x−i)xi, for i = 1, 2;
This is a two-player game. The action spaces, the uncertainty sets and the payoff functions are the same for both players.
Hence, the game is symmetric. For analogy with the notation in the rest of the section, variablesαi and xi are in bold despite
being single-entry vectors. All conditions in Assumption 1 are satisfied when δ = 1, therefore at least a robust-optimization
equilibrium exists for the robust game, whatever level of uncertainty δ, see Theorem 2. Specifically, the nominal counterpart
of the game, obtained for δ = 0, has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is the intersection point of the best-reply functions, as
observable in Figure 1, picture in the middle. Therefore, the nominal counterpart game is a symmetric game with a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium. This feature is not preserved in the robust version of the game when the levels of uncertainty are
large. Consider for example the case δ = 1 and build the worst-case best-reply functions using the Algorithm suggested in
Appendix B. As observable in Figure 1, first picture from the left, the robust game has multiple robust-optimization equilibria,
which correspond to the intersection points of the worst-case best reply functions. Moreover, only one of the seven robust-
optimization equilibria is symmetric. Figure 1, last picture from the left, reports the projections of the equilibrium outputs of
the robust game on the action space of the first player. The graphic shows that when the level of uncertainty converges to zero
only one of the robust-optimization equilibria of the robust game survives and converges smoothly to the Nash equilibrium
of the nominal game. The other robust-optimization equilibria disappear. The unique robust-optimization equilibrium that
survives to small level of uncertainty is the only equilibrium output of the robust game that in the next section will be classified
as the robust-optimization equilibrium with a Nash equilibrium counterpart.
The example marks the large differences that could occur between a simple robust game and its nominal counterpart.
These differences are inherited from the robust optimization employed by the players of the game to handle uncertainty. A
robust-optimization problem can be more complicated, and can generate a different output, than its nominal correspondence.
In robust optimization, the complexity of the optimization problem to solve depends on the shapes of the uncertainty sets.
There are conservative formulations of the uncertainty set, where the worst-case realization of the uncertain parameters does
not depend on the decision variables. In this case, the robust problem is equivalent to the nominal optimization problem by
setting the values of the uncertain parameters equal to their worst-case realizations, see Soyster (1973). As the shape of the
uncertainty sets becomes more complex, the complexity of the robust-optimization problem increases and the optimal solution
can be substantially different from the one of the nominal optimization problem, see, e.g., Ben-Tal et al (2009). This aspect of
the robust optimization is reflected and magnified in robust game theory. To magnify the difference between a robust game and
its nominal counterpart is the strategic interaction among players. In fact, in game theory a worst-case realization of the value
of an uncertain parameter does not change as a function of the decision variables (the action) of a player only but it depends
on the action of the opponents as well. This is witnessed by the current example, where the uncertainty sets considered are the
simplest possible8, the uncertainty regards a single parameter of the payoff functions, and despite those features the solution
of the robust game for δ = 1 is very different from the one of the nominal counterpart obtained for δ = 0.
8Note that a simpler shape of an uncertainty set is only the trivial one given by a single point or realization, i.e. absence of uncertainty.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of worst-case best-reply functions for the robust game in Example 1, left panel. Graphical representation of the best-
response functions of the nominal counterpart of the robust game in Example 1, panel in the middle. Projections in the action space of player 1 of the
robust-optimization equilibria of the robust game as a function of the level of uncertainty, right panel.
4.4 Measuring the effect of uncertainty
The example underlines that not all robust-optimization equilibria converge to a Nash equilibrium. Some disappear as uncer-
tainty reduces. Some change and become Nash equilibria when uncertainty vanishes for all players. These are equilibrium
configurations that have a Nash equilibrium counterpart. In this section we consider δi = δ, for all i ∈ N , for the sake of
notational simplicity, and we discriminate between robust-optimization equilibria with a Nash equilibrium counterpart and
robust-optimization equilibria without it. Specifically, a Nash equilibrium is the counterpart of a robust-optimization equilib-
rium when reducing the level of uncertainty δ of the robust game, a continuous trajectory of robust-optimization equilibria
parametrized by δ exists that converges to a Nash equilibrium. A formal definition of Nash equilibrium counterpart is provided
in the following and it is essential to discuss similarities and differences between a robust game and its nominal counterpart.
Definition 4. The action profile x∗ (0) is a Nash equilibrium counterpart of a robust-optimization equilibrium x∗
(
δ¯
)
when
there exists a continuous functionχ :
[
0, δ¯
]
→ A, such thatχ (δ) is a robust-optimization equilibrium of
{
Ai, fi,W
δ
i : i ∈ N
}
,
χ (0) = x∗ (0) and χ
(
δ¯
)
= x∗
(
δ¯
)
.
According to the definition, the counterparty relationship occurs only between a robust-optimization equilibrium and a
Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game. Specifically, given a robust game with a robust-optimization equilibrium,
if a Nash equilibrium counterpart of a robust-optimization equilibrium exists, then it is a Nash equilibrium of the nominal
counterpart game.
The existence of a robust-optimization equilibrium without a Nash equilibrium counterpart indicates that the equilibrium
strategies of the players of a robust game can have an abrupt change when uncertainty vanishes. This has several implications.
Small changes on the level of uncertainty may imply big changes on the equilibrium output of the game. Moreover, small
errors in the estimation of the level of uncertainty affecting players may cause big errors on the estimated output of the game.
On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium counterpart of a robust-optimization equilibrium is not unique and a multiplicity of
Nash equilibria that are counterpart of a robust-optimization equilibrium creates indeterminacy that complicates the prediction
of the effect of an uncertainty reduction on the equilibrium output of the game. This form of indeterminacy is not present
in a robust game that admits a unique robust-optimization equilibrium, which has a Nash equilibrium counterpart, and the
uniqueness of the equilibrium output is preserved varying the level of uncertainty. This is a robust game that does not admit
surprises in the sense that small changes in the level of uncertainty will cause small changes in the equilibrium output which,
being unique, is not path-dependent. In this respect, the definition of Nash-equilibrium counterpart of a robust-optimization
equilibrium allows us to identify a class of robust games for which the uncertainty impacts smoothly on the equilibrium output.
More generally, for this class of games small levels of uncertainty ensure that a robust-optimization equilibrium is confined in
the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game.
A set of sufficient conditions to impose on the payoff functions to have a game with a unique equilibrium output, what-
ever level of uncertainty, may be very restrictive. Here, we avoid to identify such a set of conditions and we consider a
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class of robust games that have a unique robust-optimization equilibrium and its uniqueness is preserved when reducing the
level of uncertainty. Then, we investigate the conditions to impose on the payoff functions for the existence of a unique
Nash-equilibrium counterpart. In particular, the following theorem, the proof of which is in Appendix A, provides sufficient
conditions to identify such robust games.
Theorem 6 (Existence of Nash-equilibrium counterpart). Consider δ¯ ∈ (0, 1] and a robust game
¶
Ai, fi,W
δ¯
i : i ∈ N
©
that
satisfies the conditions in Assumption 1. Assume that all the robust games
{
Ai, fi,W
δ
i : i ∈ N
}
, with δ ∈
[
0, δ¯
)
, have a
unique robust-optimization equilibrium. This robust-optimization equilibrium has a Nash equilibrium counterpart when, for
each i ∈ N , one of the following conditions is satisfied:
A1) fi (αi;xi,x−i) is strictly concave in xi ∈ Ai, for all x−i ∈ A−i and αi ∈W δ¯i ;
A2) ρδi (xi,x−i) is strictly concave in xi ∈ Ai, for all δ ∈
[
0, δ¯
]
and x−i ∈ A−i.
Imposing some further conditions on the payoff functions (in some cases of the nominal game only), the existence of
a robust-optimization equilibrium and of the counterpart Nash equilibrium allows us to characterize also the behavior of the
opportunity cost of uncertainty as uncertainty vanishes, which otherwise is not easy to determine as remarked above. Moreover,
under these further assumptions, the existence of a Nash equilibrium counterpart is sufficient to confine a robust-optimization
equilibrium of a robust game into the set of ǫ-Nash equilibria of the nominal counterpart game, with ǫ arbitrary, as long as the
level of uncertainty is sufficiently low as stated in the following theorem, the proof of which is in Appendix A.
Theorem 7. Consider a robust game with a positive level of uncertainty, i.e. δ > 0, which admits a robust-optimization
equilibrium
(
x∗i (δ) ,x
∗
−i (δ)
)
which has a Nash equilibrium counterpart
(
x∗i (0) ,x
∗
−i (0)
)
. Then,
- The opportunity cost of uncertainty evaluated in x∗−i (δ) is a continuous function in δ = 0;
- For each ǫ > 0, there exists δ (ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) and there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game that
is also a robust-optimization equilibrium of the same robust game but with δ (ǫ)-level of uncertainty;
when one of the following conditions is satisfied:
H1) for each i ∈ N , fi
(
α
0
i ; ·, ·
)
is a continuous function;
H2) for each i ∈ N , fi (αi;xi,x−i) is concave w.r.t. αi.
The results in Theorem 7 identify two different sets of sufficient conditions under which the existence of a Nash equi-
librium, which is counterpart of a robust-optimization equilibrium, implies that the opportunity cost of uncertainty of each
player computed at the robust-optimization equilibrium converges to zero as uncertainty vanishes. These sufficient conditions
regard the nominal payoff functions. Hence, studying the nominal game only, it is possible to state if the opportunity cost
of uncertainty of a player vanishes as uncertainty vanishes and, for every ǫ, if the set of all ǫ-Nash equilibria of the nominal
counterpart game contains a robust-optimization equilibrium of the robust game. In other terms, assuming valid the behavioral
hypothesis that players are robust optimizers, Theorem 7 indicates that is sufficient to impose conditions on the nominal game
only, to have a Nash equilibrium that is robust with respect to small levels of uncertainty.
The results so far discussed indicate that the existence of a Nash equilibrium counterpart is relevant for several aspects. The
first relevant aspect is the possibility to confine a robust-optimization equilibrium in a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium
counterpart as long as the level of uncertainty is sufficiently low and the neighborhood is identified by the set of ǫ-Nash
equilibria, where ǫ measures the opportunity cost of uncertainty. This indicates equilibrium configurations that are not too
dissimilar between a robust game and its nominal counterpart and predictions made according to a nominal game that are
robust to small levels of uncertainty. A second related aspect is the possibility to identify a class of robust games that are less
sensitive to changes in the level of uncertainty. Here sensitivity is intended as the impact of the uncertainty on the equilibrium
output of the game. A third relevant aspect is the possibility to use the opportunity cost of uncertainty to proxy the loss of
gain that occurs between playing a robust-optimization equilibrium and its counterpart Nash equilibrium. Indeed, under the
conditions identified in Theorem 7, reducing the level of uncertainty, each set of ǫ-Nash equilibria of the nominal counterpart
game contains at least a robust-optimization equilibrium of the robust game, indicating that the opportunity cost of uncertainty
converges to zero as uncertainty vanishes. Therefore, as long as the level of uncertainty is sufficiently low, the opportunity cost
of uncertainty is a good approximation of the loss of gain that occurs by playing a robust-optimization equilibrium instead of
its counterpart Nash equilibrium.
This last point allows us to provide a complete characterization of ǫ-Nash equilibria in terms of robust-optimization equi-
libria. On one side, the result in Theorem 5 ensures that each ǫ-Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a robust-optimization
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equilibrium by introducing some uncertainty on the parameters of the payoff functions; and the ǫ waiver of an extra profit can
be interpreted as the opportunity cost of uncertainty.On the other side, Theorem 7 indicates in which specification an uncer-
tainty set represents a criterion of choice to select a subgroup of ǫ-Nash equilibria. In fact, having a robust game that satisfies
the conditions in Theorem 7 indicates that the set of ǫ-Nash equilibria contains a robust-optimization equilibrium which can be
used to forecast the ǫ-Nash equilibrium that the players will play. This is a relevant point as the ǫ-Nash equilibria are usually
infinitely many and to forecast an ǫ-Nash equilibrium that the players will play is a discretionary choice of the game designer.
Summarizing, the interpretation/justification of the ǫ-approximation related to an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, as the cost for search-
ing for a better solution, does not allow to discriminate among the set of ǫ-Nash equilibria. On the contrary, interpreting the
ǫ-Nash equilibria as robust-optimization equilibria of a robust game, we say that there exists only a subgroup of ǫ-Nash equi-
libria that is consistent with the level of uncertainty that defines the robust game. Therefore, this theoretical foundation of
ǫ-Nash equilibria provides also a criterion of choice for ǫ-Nash equilibria.
4.5 Further remarks
The study of the similarities between an equilibrium output of a robust game and the one of the nominal counterpart game leads
us to introduce the concept of counterpart Nash equilibrium. A counterpartNash equilibrium exists when a robust-optimization
equilibrium moves smoothly towards a Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game as uncertainty vanishes. The
presence of such an equilibrium indicates a form of regularity in the way in which the game reacts to uncertainty. The
existence of a robust-optimization equilibrium that converges smoothly towards a Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart
game does not exclude, however, the existence of other equilibria that have a less regular behavior as uncertainty vanishes.
In addition, the existence of a counterpart Nash equilibrium is guaranteed under stringent conditions on the payoff functions
of a game. More general results (derived in this section) indicate that a robust-optimization equilibrium of a robust game
can be confined in the set of ǫ-Nash equilibria of the nominal counterpart game, where the ǫ approximation measures the
opportunity cost of uncertainty. These theoretical results are based on a parametrization of the uncertainty set and allow to
measure the sensitivity of a game with respect to the level of uncertainty. This is only one feature of the uncertainty that
influences the behavior of a robust player. The second element is the shape of the uncertainty set. The representation of the
uncertainty proposed in this work is indeed characterized by these two elements. In forecasting or policy analysis, it is also
relevant to measure the sensitivity of the equilibrium outputs of a robust game with respect to the shape of the uncertainty set.
In fact, a large sensitivity to the configuration of the uncertainty set by the equilibrium output of a robust game can lead to
wrong forecasts when the uncertainty is misspecified. Hence, the study of robust game theory here proposed is far from being
complete.
The discussion underlines that the validity of the results of this paper is therefore confined to the assumption of a correct
specification of the shape of the uncertainty set. In fact, only under this hypothesis, the theoretical findings on the analogies
between robust games and their nominal counterparts allow us to measure the effect of uncertainty. However, independently
of the correct specification of the shape of uncertainty set, the results in this paper do not allow us to neglect uncertainty. The
risk is of inaccurate forecasts and misleading deductions. Consider, for example, a nominal game that admits only symmetric
equilibrium configurations and a robust version of it that admits asymmetric robust-optimization equilibria. This qualitative
discordancemay lead to think of a wrong characterization of the nominal game. It occurs every time we observe robust players
play an asymmetric robust-optimization equilibriumwhile the nominal game can predict only a symmetric equilibrium output.
It is therefore relevant the possibility that a robust-optimization equilibrium of a robust game can be a Nash equilibrium of a
nominal game obtained by considering a realization included in the uncertainty sets of the parameters with unknown value.
If this is not the case, then the robust game can generate equilibrium outputs that are difficult even to imagine, not only to
forecast, by studying the nominal counterpart game. Emblematic is Example 1 in this section, which underlines that robust-
optimization equilibria characterized by asymmetric actions of the players can occur, but preserving the symmetry property
of the robust game, such equilibrium-output configurations are not possible in the nominal game. Moreover, even though a
single robust-optimization equilibrium coincides with a Nash equilibrium of a nominal version of the game, the entire set of
robust-optimization equilibria may not be replicated by a single nominal version of the game. In fact, in a robust game the
worst-case realizations of the parameters depend on the actions undertaken by the players, and this feature of robust games
may make it not possible that all the robust-optimization equilibria of a robust game are also Nash equilibria of a nominal
game obtained by considering a single constellation for the values of the parameters of the robust game.
Summarizing, the narrative in this section goes in the direction to underline analogies, similarities and differences between
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a robust game and its nominal counterpart. In the following we consider an economic application of the robust game theory.
Specifically, a robust version of a Cournot duopoly model is considered. The duopoly model has a setup similar to the one
proposed in Singh and Vives (1984). The investigation of the model aims to underline and discuss the complexity that emerges
in robust games even considering very simple settings. Consistently with the scope of the example, only a simple configuration
of the robust version of the Cournot duopoly model is considered.
5 An application: A Cournot duopoly game with payoff uncertainty and robust
firms
In this section we consider a Cournot duopoly game with linear inverse demand functions, non constant marginal costs of
production and differentiated products. The production is totally sold in the market which is characterized by a representative
consumer that expresses a certain degree of substitutability between the two products. The two firms (robust players) that
populate the duopoly produce differentiated goods, with each firm that produces one type of output only as in Singh and Vives
(1984), and are uncertain about the slopes of the inverse demand functions as well as the degree of substitutability of the two
products. Denote by q1 the production of firm 1 and by q2 the production of firm 2. The feasible levels of production for firm
i are represented by Ai, which is a subset of R.
The price at which firm i sells its output (or commodity) qi, with i = 1, 2, is given byP (qi, q−i) = max {βi − siqi − γq−i; 0},
where q−i is the production of the competitor, βi ∈ R+ is the choke price of the commodity produced by firm i, si ∈ R+
is the price sensitivity of output of firm i with respect to its own production, and γ ∈ [0, si] is the degree of substitutability
between the two products. The cost of production of output qi is given by Ci (qi) = ciqi + diq
2
i , where ci ∈ R+ and di ∈ R.
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Confining the firms’ action spaces to levels of production for which the price functions are positive and setting bi = si + di
and ai = βi − ci, firm i’s profit (or payoff) function is then given by:
fi (αi; qi, q−i) = (ai − γq−i − biqi) qi (9)
where αi = (bi, γ) is the vector of the uncertain parameters that affects the profit (payoff) function of each firm (player) i.
Firms (or players) know that the inverse demand functions are linear and downward sloping. However, the reactivity of
the market price to changes in the level of production, as well as the degree of substitutability of the products, are uncertain.
In particular, adopting the parametric representation of uncertainty proposed above, the uncertainty set of player i is given
by W δii = δiUi + (1− δi)α
0
i , where δi ∈ [0, 1] measures the level of uncertainty, α
0
i is the singleton (̂bi, γ̂), while Ui is a
non-empty compact set that includes all the possible values ofαi = (bi, γ), i.e. it represents the maximum level of uncertainty.
Hence, α0i ⊂ Ui.
The shape of the uncertainty set Ui should reflect the economic relationship among the variables of the game, for example
some variables are positively related, others negatively related. However, the uncertainty set does not need to be known
by a robust player, who, being a worst-case maximizer, needs to know only the subset made by the worst-case parameter
realizations, see Section 3. This subset does not need to reflect the shape of the uncertainty set, hence the choice of a specific
worst-case frontier is only apparently an arbitrary assumption. For example, assuming a worst-case frontier represented by a
downward sloping segment in the bi−γ plane, it does not imply that lower values of bi are associated to higher values of γ and
vice versa. See Figure 2 for an example of three different uncertainty sets that, despite having the same worst-case frontier,
indicate different economic relationships between the parameters bi and γ.
In the light of these considerations, in the following only the worst-case realizations will be defined and the economic
interpretation of the worst-case frontier is neglected as it is not relevant. In particular, Ui ⊂ R2 is assumed to be made of
the segment joining the two worst-case realizations
(
b¯i, γ
)
and (bi, γ¯), with b¯i > bi and γ¯ > γ. This is one of the simplest
representations of a worst-case frontier that makes the outputs of the robust game different from the output of the nominal
game. A simpler worst-case frontier is made by a single worst-case realization, which is the case when the uncertainty
set is component-wise and each parameter with unknown value impacts either positively or negatively the payoff function
independently of the actions of the players. As discussed above, this implies that the robust game is the nominal game with
each parameter of the payoff functions that is set at the unique worst-case realization.
9For firm i, di = 0 means constant marginal costs of production (constant return to scale technology), di > 0 means increasing marginal costs of
production (decreasing return to scale technology), and di < 0 means decreasing marginal costs of production (increasing return to scale technology).
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Figure 2: Examples of uncertainty sets with the same worst-case frontier. First picture from the left, example of uncertainty set equal to the worst-case
frontier. Second picture from the left, uncertainty set of octagonal shape. Third picture from the left, uncertainty set of rectangular shape. In the pictures, the
uncertainty set is denoted by U and its worst-case frontier by U∗.
Underlying the differences that can occur between a robust game and its nominal counterpart is one of the aims of this
example. Consistently with this aim, only the symmetric version of the duopoly is considered. Indeed, this setting allows to
better underline analogies and differences between a robust game and its nominal counterpart. Hence, the following restrictions
are imposed.
Assumption 2. These restrictions hold true in the following:
1. The nominal game is symmetric: Parameters are such that a1 = a2 = a, b̂1 = b̂2 = b̂ and the action spaces are such
that A1 = A2 = A˜;
2. The robust game is symmetric: U1 = U2 = U (which implies b1 = b2 = b and b¯1 = b¯2 = b¯) and δ1 = δ2 = δ;
3. All the parameters are non-negative: a, b¯, b, γ¯, γ ≥ 0;
4. The action space A˜ is a non-empty, closed, bounded and convex subset of R≥0;
5. 2b̂ > γ̂ (technical condition that implies a unique Nash equilibrium for the nominal game);
6. The set U is defined as follows:
U =
®
α = (b, γ) | b¯ ≥ b ≥ b ∧ γ =
γ¯b¯ − bγ
b¯ − b
−
γ¯ − γ
b¯− b
b
´
(10)
According to Assumption 2,W δ11 = W
δ2
2 = W
δ, withW δ which is given by:
W δ =
ß
(b, γ) | b¯ (δ) ≥ b ≥ b (δ) ∧ γ =
γ¯ (δ) b¯ (δ) − b (δ) γ (δ)
b¯ (δ) − b (δ)
−
γ¯ (δ) − γ (δ)
b¯ (δ) − b (δ)
b (δ)
™
(11)
where
b (δ) = (1− δ) b̂+ δb (12)
b (δ) = (1− δ) b̂+ δb (13)
γ (δ) = (1− δ) γ̂ + δγ (14)
γ (δ) = (1− δ) γ̂ + δγ (15)
HenceW δ is a non-empty, closed, bounded and convex subset of R2.
Consistently with the definition of robust game proposed in Section 2, the robust Cournot duopoly game can therefore be
defined as follows: ¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ {1, 2}
©
(16)
where the dependence ofW δ , f and A on i can be dropped because of the assumption of symmetric game. By Definition 1,
the worst-case payoff function of firm (player) i is given by
ρδ (qi, q−i) = min
α∈W δ
f (α; qi, q−i) (17)
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The restrictions imposed in Assumption 2 ensure that action spaces of firms as well as the uncertainty sets respect the condi-
tions imposed in Assumption 1. In addition, under the parameter value restrictions imposed in Assumption 2, it is straight-
forward to verify that the payoff function of firm i defined in (9) is continuous and it is concave with respect to qi for all
(α, q−i) ∈ U × A˜. Therefore, independently of the level of uncertainty, the worst-case payoff function of player i is well-
defined, continuous and concave with respect to the action space of the player himself, and by Theorem 2 a robust-optimization
equilibrium of the robust duopoly game exists as well as a Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game.
To verify the number of robust-optimization equilibria that exist and to compute them, we derive the worst-case best reply
functions. For δ > 0, the worst-case best reply (or reaction) function for robust firm i is defined as follows:10
Rδ (q−i) := argmax
qi∈A
ρδ (qi, q−i) =

a
2b(δ)
−
γ(δ)
2b(δ)
q−i if q (δ) > q−i ≥ 0
γ−γ
b−b
q−i if q (δ) ≥ q−i ≥ q (δ)
a
2b(δ) −
γ(δ)
2b(δ)q−i if q
M (δ) > q−i > q (δ)
0 if q−i ≥ q
M (δ)
(18)
where
q (δ) =
a
(
b− b
)
2b (δ)
(
γ − γ
)
+ γ (δ)
(
b− b
) (19)
q (δ) =
a
(
b− b
)
2b (δ)
(
γ − γ
)
+ γ (δ)
(
b− b
) (20)
qM (δ) =
a
γ¯ (δ)
(21)
In accordance to the definition of robust-optimization equilibrium in (8), see also Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006) and
Crespi et al (2017), given an uncertainty level δ ∈ [0, 1] and the robust best-reply function in (18), the output set
(
q∗i , q
∗
−i
)
∈ A
is a robust-optimization equilibrium of the robust game (16) if and only if
q∗i = R
δ
(
q∗−i
)
∀i ∈ {1, 2} (22)
where “=” substitutes “∈” in (8), as for robust game here considered the robust best replies are functions instead of corre-
spondences. Hereafter, a robust-optimization equilibrium of the robust duopoly model (18) will be called Cournot robust-
optimization equilibrium (Cournot ROE in short), which becomes a Cournot-Nash equilibrium when uncertainty vanishes.
Setting δ = 0, uncertainty vanishes and the robust duopoly game with Cournot competition becomes a nominal Cournot
duopoly game where players’ behavior is characterized by a classical best-reply function:
R0 (q−i) =

a
2̂b
− γ̂
2̂b
q−i if q
M (0) > q−i > 0
0 if q−i ≥ qM (0)
(23)
Solving system (22) when δ = 0, it results that the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart of the
duopoly game is the one provided in the following proposition (see proof in Appendix C).
Proposition 1 (Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the nominal Cournot duopoly). Consider Assumption 2. The nominal version of
the Cournot duopoly game, i.e. game (16) with δ = 0, admits one and only one Cournot-Nash equilibrium which is given by
(
qNE , qNE
)
=
Ç
a
2b̂+ γ̂
,
a
2b̂+ γ̂
å
(24)
10The analytical expression of the worst-case best reply function can be obtained by employing the algorithm in Appendix B.
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The strategic profile in (24) represents a symmetric Nash equilibrium; all the players involved play the same Nash strategy,
which is unique. Symmetry and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution are not guaranteed in the robust duopoly game. A
striking feature of the robust duopoly model arises comparing the robust reaction function (18) with its nominal counterpart
(23). The latter one is monotonically decreasing while the robust counterpart is in general a non-monotone function. This
difference reflects in the number of the robust-optimization equilibria of the robust game, which can be multiple and even
asymmetric as stated in the following proposition (see proof in Appendix C).
Proposition 2 (Cournot-robust-optimization equilibria of the robust Cournot duopoly). Consider the robust Cournot duopoly
in (16), with δ > 0. If the shape of the uncertainty set U is such that:
1. b− b > γ − γ, then (
qROE1 , qROE1
)
=
Ç
a
2b (δ) + γ (δ)
,
a
2b (δ) + γ (δ)
å
(25)
is the unique robust-optimization equilibrium of the robust Cournot duopoly in (16) and it converges to Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of its nominal counterpart game when δ → 0.
2. b − b = γ − γ, then robust-optimization equilibria fill the interval E1 =
{
(q, q) |q ≥ q ≥ q
}
. For δ → 0, the segment
E shrinks into the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
(
qNE , qNE
)
in (24).
3. b− b < γ − γ and the level of uncertainty is such that
i) δ < δ∗, where
δ∗ =
γ − 2b
γ − 2b+ 2b̂− γ̂
(< 1) , (26)
then (
qROE2 , qROE2
)
=
Å
a
2b (δ) + γ (δ)
,
a
2b (δ) + γ (δ)
ã
(27)
is the unique robust-optimization equilibrium of the Cournot duopoly in (16) and it converges to Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of its nominal counterpart when δ → 0.
ii) δ = δ∗, then robust-optimization equilibria fill the segment E2 =
¶Ä
q, a2b(δ) − q
ä
|qM > a2b(δ) − q, q > q
©
.
iii) δ∗ < δ < 1 (δ∗ > 0 is equivalent to 2b < γ), then
(
qROE2 , qROE2
)
,(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
=
Ç
a
(
b− b
)
2b (δ)
(
b− b
)
+ γ (δ)
(
γ − γ
) , a (γ − γ)
2b (δ)
(
b− b
)
+ γ (δ)
(
γ − γ
)å (28)
and
(
qROE4 , qROE3
)
are robust-optimization equilibrium of the Cournot duopoly in (16).
Proposition 2 underlines that a robust Cournot duopoly can have multiple robust-optimization equilibria, see, e.g., Figure 3.
Therefore, in a robust Cournot duopoly game there may even be uncertainty about the Cournot-robust-optimization equilibrium
the firms play. The multiplicity of equilibria vanishes as uncertainty vanishes: The nominal counterpart of the game admits a
unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium, as indicated in Proposition 1. In addition, Proposition 2 underlines that the coexistence of
Cournot-robust-optimization equilibria requires a certain level of uncertainty as well as a certain shape of the uncertainty set.
The existence of multiple robust-optimization equilibria is only one peculiarity of the robust duopoly model (16). The
second peculiarity is the presence of asymmetric robust-optimization equilibria (where a robust firm produces more/less than
the other one) despite the assumption of identical robust players. The existence of asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game
is not prerogative of robust games. It occurs in nominal games as well. After all, a robust game can be seen as a nominal game
as shown in the previous sections. The interesting point to underline here is indeed another one, that is the difference between
a robust game that admits asymmetric equilibria and its nominal counterpart game that does not. This aspect has relevant
economic implications. In fact, predictions made according to a nominal game can be misleading and uncertainty can have a
strong impact on the final outcome of a game.
Summarizing, as the current duopolymodel shows, multiple equilibria instead of a unique output and asymmetric equilibria
instead of symmetric outputs can be obtained by introducing uncertainty in a game. It is also worth underlining that the worst-
case frontier considered is among the simplest ones. Thus, the differences between the robust duopoly model and its nominal
counterpart is not the result of an ad-hoc worst-case frontier of the uncertainty set. A more complicated shape of the worst-case
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frontier could imply an even more marked contrast between the output of robust game and the one of its nominal counterpart,
suggesting that using a nominal game to infer the output of a robust game can lead to wrong forecasts.
The presence of multiple and asymmetric robust-optimization equilibria in a symmetric robust duopoly game implies
heterogeneous levels of production for the two identical firms. This implies that a firm experiences a maximum guaranteed
payoff (profit) at the equilibrium output which is higher than the one of the competitor, as specified in the following proposition
(see proof in Appendix C).
Proposition 3. Assume that
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
is a robust-optimization equilibrium for game (16). Playing this robust-
optimization equilibrium, robust firm (or player) 1 produces less then the competitor and it records a lower maximum-
guaranteed profit. The opposite holds true in
(
qROE4 , qROE3
)
.
It comes out that in a robust Cournot duopoly game, which is symmetric and whose nominal counterpart has a unique sym-
metric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, an increase of uncertainty may generate asymmetry in the final outcome of the game and
the earnings are not equally distributed. In other words, the aversion to uncertainty can cause two identical firms to coordinate
to play an asymmetric robust-optimization equilibrium where one firm produces more and records a higher maximum guar-
anteed payoff. Moreover, the asymmetric robust-optimization equilibrium does not have a nominal counterpart, consistently
with Definition 4. This confirms that uncertainty and ambiguity aversion can favor forms of coordination between firms non
consistent with the ones predicted by a nominal game. On the contrary, the symmetric Cournot-robust-optimization equilib-
rium has a Cournot-Nash equilibrium counterpart. As indicated in Proposition 2, the Cournot-robust-optimization equilibrium(
qROE1 , qROE1
)
converges smoothly towards the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
(
qNE , qNE
)
when the level of uncertainty goes
to zero. For a low level of uncertainty, the existence of a Cournot-robust-optimization equilibrium with a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium counterpart is ensured by Theorem 6. In fact the robust-duopoly model here considered satisfies all the conditions
imposed in Theorem 6.
Concerning the payoffs of the players at the robust-optimization equilibria, an asymmetric robust-optimization equilibrium
ensures to a firm a higher profit than the one the same firm would experience by playing the symmetric robust-optimization
equilibrium. The same asymmetric robust-optimization equilibrium is not convenient for the competitor. In particular, we
have the following result (see proof in Appendix C).
Proposition 4. Assume that
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
,
(
qROE2 , qROE2
)
and
(
qROE4 , qROE3
)
are robust-optimization equilibria, then
ρδ
(
qROE4 , qROE3
)
≥ ρδ
(
qROE2 , qROE2
)
≥ ρδ
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
(29)
Therefore, for firm 2 it is convenient (in terms of maximum guaranteed payoff) to play the asymmetric robust-optimization
equilibrium
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
rather than the symmetric robust-optimization equilibrium
(
qROE2 , qROE2
)
. On the contrary,
for firm 1 it is convenient to play the symmetric robust-optimization equilibrium
(
qROE2 , qROE2
)
, rather than the asym-
metric robust-optimization equilibrium
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
. Symmetric arguments suggest that the vice versa is true when the
asymmetric robust-optimization equilibrium
(
qROE4 , qROE3
)
is considered in place of
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
.
As a further remark on this point, in Figure 3, third picture from the left, we can observe that the nominal profit of a firm
at a robust-optimization equilibrium is larger than the one at the Nash equilibrium. Despite the profit of a firm at the Nash
equilibrium being lower than the one at a robust-optimization equilibrium, it is always convenient to reduce one’s own level of
uncertainty. This benefit can also be quantified. As underlined in the previous section, each firm (robust player) associates an
opportunity cost of uncertainty to each possible action profile of this robust duopoly game. This opportunity cost of uncertainty
measures the maximum amount that a single firm would pay to eliminate uncertainty when the competitor does not modify its
own level of production. According to definition (3), the opportunity cost of uncertainty for firm i is given by
Cδ (q−i) = ρ
0
(
R0 (q−i) , q−i
)
− ρ0
(
Rδ (q−i) , q−i
)
(30)
where the best-reply functionRδ is as in (18).
The behavior of firm i’s opportunity cost of uncertainty at a robust-optimization equilibrium, as a function of the level of
uncertainty, is drawn in Figure 3, picture in the middle. Considering the symmetric Cournot-robust-optimization equilibrium,
the opportunity cost of uncertainty converges to zero when the level of uncertainty of the game vanishes. This indicates
that the Cournot-robust-optimization equilibrium converges smoothly to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the nominal game
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Figure 3: First picture form the left, we observe in light-gray the set of all ǫ-Nash equilibria of the nominal duopoly game, with ǫ =
max
{
Cδ
1
(
qROE4
)
, Cδ
2
(
qROE3
)}
, which contains the robust-optimization equilibrium
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
, see Theorem 3, and
(
qROE4 , qROE3
)
by symmetry. In dark gray the set of all ǫ-Nash equilibria of the nominal duopoly game, with ǫ = max
{
Cδ
1
(
qROE2
)
, Cδ
2
(
qROE2
)}
, which contains the
robust-optimization equilibrium
(
qROE2 , qROE2
)
, see Theorem 3. Second picture from the left, the opportunity cost of uncertainty for firm i as a function
of the level of uncertainty δ. The third picture form the left, the different of profit that a firm obtain at a robust-optimization equilibrium with respect to the
Nash equilibrium of the game.
when uncertainty vanishes, i.e. the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is its nominal counterpart. The asymmetric Cournot-robust-
optimization equilibria disappear instead when uncertainty shrinks, see Proposition 2, therefore they do not have a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium counterpart. Nevertheless, the opportunity cost of uncertainty at these equilibria shrinks when uncertainty
reduces. This is not a surprise, as for the robust Cournot duopoly game the results in Theorem 4 are valid since the payoff
functions are concave with respect to the uncertain parameters.
As a final remark, the theoretical results developed in the previous section, specifically Theorem 3, indicate that in equilib-
rium robust players play an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, where ǫmeasures the maximum of players’ opportunity cost of uncertainty. To
underline this aspect, consider a parameter constellation such that three Cournot-robust-optimization equilibria exist. Figure
3, first picture from the left, shows that the Cournot-robust-optimization equilibria of the duopoly game are ǫ-Cournot-Nash
equilibria.
At the end of this section, it is worth noting the modeling flexibility offered by the robust game theory. As already pointed
out, the worst-case best-reply functions are not monotonically decreasing despite the assumptions of a linear inverse demand
function and of linear marginal costs. This is a relevant point. In fact non-monotone reaction functions are assumed by many,
see for example Rand (1978), to show the inherent chaotic nature of a Cournot system. However, microeconomic founda-
tions of Cournot duopoly games characterized by non-monotonic reaction curves usually require ad-hoc assumptions, such as
marginal costs represented by cubic functions see, e.g. Furth (1986), or cost functions with an inter-firm externalities, see, e.g.,
Poston and Stewart (1978). This opens the puzzle on which market structures are capable of generating non-descending best
reply functions. Robust game theory shows that non-monotonic reaction curves are possible even assuming simple market
structures as long as there is some uncertainty about payoffs and firms are worst-case maximizers.
6 Summary and conclusions
A robust game is a generalization of a normal form game where the worst-case approach is employed by players to handle
uncertainty about payoff environment and this uncertainty is represented by a bounded set of possible realizations. This mod-
eling framework is complementary to the ambiguity-game framework where players have only vague beliefs about opponents’
actions and define strategies that maximize their Choquet expected utilities. The theoretical results in this work underline the
analogies, similarities and differences between a robust game and its nominal counterpart.
The first aim has been to provide theoretical foundations for robust games by investigating the link with nominal games.
The main results are summarized in the following. Given a robust game
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
, we have that
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•
{
Ai, fi,W
0
i : i ∈ N
}
is a nominal game, it can be rewritten as {Ai, fi : i ∈ N}, and it is called nominal counterpart
game;
• (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is a robust-optimization equilibrium of the robust game if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the
(nominal) game
¶
Ai, ρ
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
, where ρδii are the worst-case payoff functions defined in (1);
• Given the action of the opponents x−i, player i’s opportunity cost of uncertainty is measured by function C
δi
i (x−i)
defined in (3);
• A robust-optimization equilibrium of a robust game is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game, where ǫ
is the maximum of players’ opportunity cost of uncertainty at the robust-optimization equilibrium, see Theorem 3.
• If (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is a robust-optimization equilibrium of a robust game, ǫ defined as in Theorem 3measures the uncertainty
aversion at the equilibrium in terms of opportunity cost of uncertainty;
• Each ǫ-Nash equilibrium of a nominal game can be seen as a robust-optimization equilibrium of a robust game where
the first is its nominal counterpart, see Theorem 5.
• Under some regularity assumptions, player i’s opportunity cost of uncertainty converges to zero as the uncertainty of the
game vanishes and a robust-optimization equilibrium of the robust game converges to a Nash equilibrium of the nominal
counterpart game.
The second aim of this paper has been to show that neglecting players’ aversion towards the uncertainty of the environment
of the game may be dangerous. Indeed, the possible differences in terms of equilibrium outputs between a robust game and its
nominal counterpart may be many.
A natural extension of the current work is to develop a general game-theoretical framework that accounts for both ambigu-
ity on the opponents’ actions and uncertainty of the payoff environment of the game. An intermediate research project could
be limited to introducing soft-robust games where players’ uncertain payoff environment is described by a distribution that be-
longs to some set of probability measures and players take actions merging robust and stochastic approach as in Ben-Tal et al
(2010). The robust-game framework can be generalized to account for different degrees of uncertainty aversion. As a player
may be pessimistic looking for the maximum guaranteed payoff, another one may be optimistic looking for the maximum
profit possible. Experimental tests of the robust-game setup is another relevant research topic. Important is also to study and
to model the time evolution of the uncertainty aversion when historical data on opponents’ actions and performances become
available.
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Appendix A - Proofs of results on robust games.
Proof of Theorem 1. This proof of the Theorem follows the one proposed in Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006) and is reported
here only for the sake of completeness. We will proceed by constructing a point-to-set mapping that satisfies the conditions of
Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem, see Kakutani (1941), and whose fixed points are precisely the equilibria of the robust game.
To begin, clearly, A = ×i∈NAi is non-empty, closed, bounded, and convex, since Ai is, ∀i ∈ N . Define Φ : A→ 2
A as
Φ (x1, . . . , xn) =
ß
(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ A|yi ∈ arg max
ui∈Ai
ρδii (ui,x−i) , i = 1, . . . , n
™
(31)
Let us show that Φ (x1, . . . , xN ) 6= ∅, ∀ (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ A. By hypothesis of ρ
δi
i continuous in A for all i ∈ N , it follows
that ∀i, ∀x−i ∈ A−i fixed, ρ
δi
i (xi,x−i) is continuous on Ai, a non-empty, closed, and bounded subset of an Euclidean space.
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Thus, by Weierstrass’ Extreme Value Theorem,
arg max
ui∈Ai
ρδii (ui,x−i) 6= ∅ (32)
Accordingly, ∀ (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A,
Φ (x1, . . . , xn) 6= ∅ (33)
It is obvious from the definition of Φ, that ∀ (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A, Φ (x1, . . . , xn) ⊆ A, and that (x1, . . . , xn) is an equilibrium
of the robust game if and only if it is a fixed point of Φ. Thus, we need only prove the existence of a fixed point of Φ. Let us
therefore establish that Φ satisfies the remaining conditions of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem; that is, we must show that Φ
maps A into a family of closed, convex sets, and that Φ is upper semi-continuous. Let us first prove that, ∀ (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A,
Φ (x1, . . . , xn) is a convex set. Suppose
(u1, . . . , un) , (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Φ (x1, . . . , xN ) (34)
Then, by the definition of Φ, ∀i ∈ N , ∀yi ∈ Ai,
ρδii (ui,x−i) = ρ
δi
i (vi,x−i) ≥ ρ
δi
i (yi,x−i) (35)
It follows that, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], ∀yi ∈ Ai,
λρδii (ui,x−i) + (1− λ) ρ
δi
i (vi,x−i) ≥ ρ
δi
i (yi,x−i) (36)
By the hypothesis of ρδii concave on Ai, it follows that
λ (u1, . . . , un) + (1− λ) (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Φ (x1, . . . , xn) (37)
Hence Φ (x1, . . . , xn) is a non-empty and convex subset of A. Let us now show that Φ is upper semi-continuous. Suppose
that, for k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , (
xk1 , . . . , x
k
n
)
∈ A (38)
(
yk1 , . . . , y
k
n
)
∈ Φ
(
xk1 , . . . , x
k
n
)
(39)
lim
k→∞
(
xk1 , . . . , x
k
n
)
= (u1, . . . , un) ∈ A (40)
lim
k→∞
(
yk1 , . . . , y
k
n
)
= (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ A (41)
By the definition of Φ, we know that, ∀k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., ∀i ∈ N and ∀wi ∈ Ai,
ρδii
(
yki ,x
k
−i
)
≥ ρδii
(
wi,x
k
−i
)
(42)
Taking the limit of both sides
lim
k→+∞
ρδii
(
yki ,x
k
−i
)
≥ lim
k→+∞
ρδii
(
wi,x
k
−i
)
(43)
by hypothesis of continuity of ρδii on A, we obtain that, ∀i ∈ N and ∀wi ∈ Ai,
ρδii (vi,u−i) ≥ ρ
δi
i (wi,u−i) (44)
Hence,
(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Φ (u1, . . . , un) (45)
and Φ is upper semi-continuous. Note that the fact that Φ (x1, . . . , xN ) is closed follows from the fact that Φ is upper
semi-continuous. This completes the proof that Φ satisfies the conditions of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem, and thereby
establishes the existence of an equilibrium in the robust game.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Since fi are continuous onW
δi
i ×A by hypothesis,W
δi
i ×A is bounded by hypothesis, and the worst-case
payoff function is defined as
ρδii (xi,x−i) = min
αi∈W
δi
i
fi (αi;xi,x−i) (46)
the continuity of ρδii follows from Berge’s Maximum Theorem, see (Berge, 1963, pp. 115-117). Consider xi ∈ Ai and
yi ∈ Ai. By the hypothesis of the convexity of Ai and the concavity of fi on Ai, for each λ ∈ [0, 1] and for each x−i ∈ A−i
we have:
ρδii (λxi + (1− λ) yi,x−i) = minαi∈W δii
f (αi;λxi + (1− λ) yi,x−i)
= f (α∗i ;λxi + (1− λ) yi,x−i)
≥ λf (α∗i ;xi,x−i) + (1− λ) f (α
∗
i ; yi,x−i)
≥ λmin
αi∈W
δi
i
f (αi;xi,x−i) + (1− λ)min
αi∈W
δi
i
f (αi; yi,x−i)
≥ λρδii (xi,x−i) + (1− λ) ρ
δi
i (yi,x−i)
(47)
which proves the concavity of ρδii (·,x−i) for every x−i ∈ A−i.
Proof of Theorem 2. The conditions in Assumption 1 imply that the worst-case payoff functions satisfy the conditions imposed
in Theorem 1, see Lemma 1. Then, the first point of the theorem follows (the first point is also considered in Crespi et al (2017),
the proof is reported here for the sake of completeness). Concerning the second point. If
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
satisfies the
conditions in Assumption 1, then
¶
Ai, fi,W
δ¯i
i : i ∈ N
©
, with δ¯i ∈ [0, δi], satisfies the conditions in Assumption 1 since
W δ¯i ⊆W δ¯i . Hence, the proof of the second point of theorem follows form the first one.
Proof of Theorem 3. Given a generic strategic profile
(
x+1 , . . . , x
+
n
)
∈ A, we have that
ρ0i
(
x+i ,x
+
−i
)
≥ ρ0i
(
xi,x
+
−i
)
− max
xi∈Ai
ρ0i
(
xi,x
+
−i
)
+ ρ0i
(
x+i ,x
+
−i
)
, ∀xi ∈ Ai and ∀i ∈ N (48)
Then, let (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ A be a robust-optimization equilibrium of
¶
Ai, fi,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
, it follows that
ρ0i
(
x∗i ,x
∗
−i
)
≥ ρ0i
(
xi,x
∗
−i
)
− max
xi∈Ai
ρ0i
(
xi,x
∗
−i
)
+ ρ0i
(
x∗i ,x
∗
−i
)
= ρ0i
(
xi,x
∗
−i
)
− Cδii
(
x
∗
−i
)
, ∀i ∈ N (49)
where Cδii (x−i) is defined in (3). Set ǫ = max
¶
Cδ11
(
x
∗
−1
)
, . . . , Cδnn
(
x
∗
−n
)©
, we get
ρ0i
(
x∗i ,x
∗
−i
)
≥ ρ0i
(
xi,x
∗
−i
)
− ǫ, ∀xi ∈ Ai and ∀i ∈ N (50)
Since ρ0i corresponds to the payoff function of agent i in the nominal counterpart game, for every i ∈ N , (50) proves the first
result of the theorem. To prove that (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ A is not an ǫˆ-Nash equilibrium, with ǫˆ ∈ (0, ǫ), note that by definition
Cδii
(
x
∗
−i
)
≥ 0. If Cδii
(
x
∗
−i
)
= 0 for all i ∈ N , then ǫ = 0 by definition and ǫˆ ∈ (0, ǫ) cannot exist. If ∃ i ∈ N such that
Cδii
(
x
∗
−i
)
> 0, then ∃
(
xoi ,x
∗
−i
)
∈ A, and
(
xoi ,x
∗
−i
)
6=
(
x∗i ,x
∗
−i
)
, such that ρ0i
(
xoi ,x
∗
−i
)
− ρ0i
(
x∗i ,x
∗
−i
)
= ǫ > 0. It follows
that
(
x∗i ,x
∗
−i
)
cannot be an ǫˆ-Nash equilibrium, with ǫˆ ∈ (0, ǫ). This proves the second result of the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 2. From the assumption of concavity of fi (αi;xi,x−i) w.r.t. αi, ∀i ∈ N , we have that
ρ0i (xi,x−i)− ρ
δi
i (xi,x−i)− δi
(
ρ0i (xi,x−i)− ρ
1
i (xi,x−i)
)
≤ 0 (51)
Then, by the sub-additivity property of the maximum operator, it follows that
maxxi∈Ai ρ
0
i (xi,x−i) ≤ maxxi∈Ai ρ
δi
i (xi,x−i) + maxxi∈Ai δi
(
ρ0i (xi,x−i)− ρ
1
i (xi,x−i)
)
≤ ρ0i
(
x+i (δi) ,x−i
)
+maxxi∈Ai δi
(
ρ0i (xi,x−i)− ρ
1
i (xi,x−i)
) (52)
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where x+i (δi) is as in (3) and the last inequality follows from the property of the worst-case payoff function (see Property 1).
This proves the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 5. By assumption (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the nominal game {Ai, fi : i ∈ N}. Then,
define
¶
Ai, f¯i,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
such that:
f¯i (αi;xi,x−i) = fi (xi,x−i)−αi1{xi 6=x∗i}
, ∀i ∈ N (53)
where 1{·} is the indicator function, andW
δi
i = δi [0, H ], withH > ǫ. Set δi =
ǫ
H
, the worst-case payoff functions ρδii of the
robust game
¶
Ai, f¯i,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
are such that ρδii
(
x∗i ,x
∗
−i
)
= fi
(
x∗i ,x
∗
−i
)
and ρδii (xi,x−i) = fi (xi,x−i)−ǫ otherwise.
It follows that
(
x∗i ,x
∗
−i
)
is a robust-optimization equilibrium of the robust game
¶
Ai, f¯i,W
δi
i : i ∈ N
©
, which reduces to the
nominal game {Ai, fi : i ∈ N} when δi = 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6. Note that condition A1) implies condition A2), see Lemma 1. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that
the statement of the theorem holds true under condition A2). Moreover, considering the case δ¯ = 1, the generalization to
the case δ¯ ∈ (0, 1] is straightforward. Choose δ ∈ [0, 1] arbitrarily. By the conditions imposed in Assumption 1 and since
by hypothesis ρδi (xi,x−i) are strictly concave w.r.t. xi for all x−i ∈ A−i, the (robust) best reply R
δ
i defined in (7), with
i = 1, . . . , n, are single valued, i.e. they are real valued functions instead of more general correspondences: Rδi : A−i → Ai.
In fact, it is well-known that the maximum set of a strictly concave function is either empty or single-valued. Since the
conditions imposed in Assumption 1 ensure that it is not empty, then it is single valued. Moreover, due to the assumption of
continuity of ρδi w.r.t (xi,x−i), by the Berge’s Maximum Theorem we known that R
δ
i (x−i), for all i = 1, . . . , n, are upper
hemicontinuous in x−i ∈ A−i. Since it is well-known that a single-valued correspondence is upper hemicontinuous if and
only if it is continuous as a function, we have that Rδi (x−i), for all i = 1, . . . , n, are continuous functions in x−i ∈ A−i.
Consider nowRδi (x−i) as a function of (x−i, δ), i.e. R
δ
i : A−i× [0, 1]→ Ai. By the same argument and noting that δ defines
a linear and convex combination of αi ∈ W δ¯i , the further hypothesis of fi (αi;xi,x−i) continuous on W
δ¯
i × A ensures
Rδi (x−i), for all i = 1, . . . , n, continuous in (x−i, δ). Define T (x, δ) =
(
Rδ1 (x−1) , . . . , R
δ
n (x−n)
)
. By construction
T (x, δ) : A × [0, 1] → A is a single valued correspondence (a function), it is continuous, and the robust-optimization
equilibria of the robust game
{
Ai, fi,W
δ
i : i ∈ N
}
are the solution of T (x, δ) = x. Hence, by Theorem 2 it follows that
for each δ ∈ [0, 1] there is a solution (not necessarily unique), labeled by x∗ (δ), of T (x, δ) = x. Moreover, by hypothesis
that the robust game has a unique robust-optimization equilibrium, there exists a unique solution of T (x, δ) = x, labeled
by x∗ (δ). Consider a δ∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose
{
δk
}
is an arbitrary sequence converging to δ∗, as k → +∞, and consider the
set B :=
{
x
∗
(
δk
)
: k = 1, 2, . . .
}
⊂ A, where x∗
(
δk
)
is solution of T
(
x, δk
)
= x in A (i.e. it is a robust-optimization
equilibrium of
¶
Ai, fi,W
δk
i : i ∈ N
©
). Since A is complete, there exists a subsequence
{
vk
}
of
{
δk
}
such that
{
x
∗
(
vk
)}
is convergent to some z ∈ A. By the assumption of continuity of T in (x, δ) for each x ∈ A, it follows that z = T (z, δ).
Since x = T (x, δ) has a unique solution by the hypothesis of a unique robust-optimization equilibrium for the robust game,
we have z = x∗ (δ∗). This implies that x∗
(
δk
)
converges to x∗ (δ∗). Since
{
δk
}
is an arbitrary sequence converging to δ∗,
we have that for each δ ∈ [0, 1], equation T (x, δ) = x has a solution (at least a solution) x∗ (δ) ∈ A and x∗ (δ) → x∗ (δ∗)
as δ → δ∗. By the arbitrariness of δ∗ ∈ [0, 1] and since x∗ (δ) is a robust-optimization equilibrium for the robust game with
δ-level of uncertainty and x∗ (0) is the Nash equilibrium of the nominal counterpart game by definition of T , the proof of the
theorem is complete.
Proof of Theorem 7. Assume H1) holds. By hypothesis, a robust-optimization equilibrium exists, let us denote it by x∗ (δ)
which has a Nash-equilibrium counterpart x∗ (0), which implies x∗ (δ) → x∗ (0), as δ → 0+. By definition, see (3), the
opportunity cost of uncertainty of player i is given by
Cδi
(
x
∗
−i (δ)
)
= max
xi∈Ai
ρ0i
(
xi,x
∗
−i (δ)
)
− ρ0i
(
x∗i (δ) ,x
∗
−i (δ)
)
(54)
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It holds:
limδ→0+ C
δ
i
(
x
∗
−i (δ)
)
= limδ→0+ maxxi∈Ai ρ
0
i
(
xi,x
∗
−i (δ)
)
− limδ→0+ ρ
0
i
(
x∗i (δ) ,x
∗
−i (δ)
)
= limδ→0+ maxxi∈Ai ρ
0
i
(
xi,x
∗
−i (δ)
)
− ρ0i
(
x∗i (0) ,x
∗
−i (0)
) (55)
The last inequality follows from the continuity assumption on fi
(
α
0
i ; ·, ·
)
:= ρ0i (·, ·), while the existence of the maximum
follows from the continuity assumption on ρ0i (·, ·) and compactness of Ai. Take a sequence δn → 0
+ as n → +∞ and
consider
xi (δn) ∈ arg max
xi∈Ai
ρ0i
(
xi,x
∗
−i (δn)
)
(56)
Since Ai is compact, without loss of generality we can assume xi (δn)→ x¯i ∈ Ai. The continuity assumption on ρ0i gives
lim
n→+∞
ρ0i
(
xi (δn) ,x
∗
−i (δn)
)
→ ρ0i
(
x¯i,x
∗
−i (0)
)
(57)
Then, from
ρ0i
(
xi (δn) ,x
∗
−i (δn)
)
≥ ρ0i
(
xi,x
∗
−i (δn)
)
, ∀xi ∈ Ai (58)
it follows
ρ0i
(
x¯i,x
∗
−i (0)
)
≥ ρ0i
(
xi,x
∗
−i (0)
)
, ∀xi ∈ Ai (59)
which gives
x¯i ∈ arg max
xi∈Ai
ρ0i
(
xi,x
∗
−i (0)
)
(60)
Hence
ρ0i
(
x¯i,x
∗
−i (0)
)
= ρ0i
(
x∗i (0) ,x
∗
−i (0)
)
(61)
and the proof of the first point of the theorem under assumption H1) is completed. Assume H2) holds. The continuity of
opportunity cost of uncertainty (i.e. the first point of the theorem) follows from Lemma 2. If the first point holds true, the
second point of the theorem is a consequence of Theorem 3 and the definition of ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Appendix B - Algorithm for worst-case best-reply functions
Consider a robust game, where the uncertainty sets are polyhedral, then the following algorithm can used to obtain the worst-
case best-reply functions.
Algorithm:
1: Define W¯ δii as the set of corner points ofW
δi
i .
2: Build the function gδii : W¯
δi
i ×A−i → R, defined as follows
gδii (αi;x−i) = arg max
xi∈Ai
fi (αi|xi,x−i) (62)
3: Build the function hδii : W¯
δi
i ×A−i → R, defined as follows
h
δi
i (αi;x−i) =

1 if fi
(
αi|g
δi
i (αi;x−i) ,x−i
)
= min
αj∈W
δi
i
fi
(
αj |g
δi
i (αi;x−i) ,x−i
)
and g
δi
i (αi;x−i) ∈ Ai
0 otherwise
(63)
4: Player i’s worst-case best-reply function can be obtained as
Rδi (x−i) =
∑
αi∈W¯
δi
i
gδii (αi;x−i)h
δi
i (αi;x−i)−
∑
αi∈W¯
δi
i
∑
αj∈W¯
δi
i
j>i
gδii (αi;x−i)h
δi
i (αi;x−i)h
δi
i (αj ;x−i) (64)
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Appendix C - Proofs of the results on the robust duopoly model in Section 5.
Proof of Proposition 1. The action space of the nominal Cournot duopoly model can be partitioned in 4 regions
Ω1 =
{
(q1, q2) |
a
γ̂
> q2 ≥ 0 ∧
a
γ̂
> q1 ≥ 0
}
Ω3 =
{
(q1, q2) | q2 ≥
a
γ̂
∧ a
γ̂
> q1 ≥ 0
}
Ω2 =
{
(q1, q2) |
a
γ̂
> q2 ≥ 0 ∧ q1 ≥
a
γ̂
}
Ω4 =
{
(q1, q2) |q2 ≥
a
γ̂
0 ∧ q1 ≥
a
γ̂
}
Moreover, by definition a Nash equilibrium (q∗1 , q
∗
2) of the game solves
(q∗1 , q
∗
2) =
(
R0 (q∗2) , R
0 (q∗1)
)
(65)
Hence, a sufficient condition for (q∗1 , q
∗
2) ∈ Ωi, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, to be a Nash equilibrium is
(
R0 (q∗2) , R
0 (q∗1)
)
∈ Ωi.
Then, since ∀ (q∗1 , q
∗
2) ∈ Ω4 holds that
(
R0 (q∗2) , R
0 (q∗1)
)
= (0, 0) /∈ Ω4, Nash equilibria do not exist in Ω4. At the same
time, ∀ (q∗1 , q
∗
2) ∈ Ω3 the condition
(
R0 (q∗2) , R
0 (q∗1)
)
=
(
0, R0 (0)
)
∈ Ω3 implies R0 (0) ≥
a
γ̂
, or equivalently γ̂ > 2b̂,
which violates Assumption 2. Thus, there are no Nash equilibria in Ω3. By symmetry, there are no Nash equilibria in Ω2.
Finally, straightforward algebra shows that the Nash equilibrium in (24) is the unique solution of the system (q1, q2) =(
R0 (q2) , R
0 (q1)
)
in Ω1 and it always exists under Assumption 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. By hypothesis δ > 0. Then, the action space of the robust Cournot duopoly model in (16) can be
partitioned in 16 regions.
Ω1 =
{
(q1, q2) |q (δ) > q1 ≥ 0 ∧ q (δ) > q2 ≥ 0
}
Ω9 =
{
(q1, q2) |qM (δ) > q1 ≥ q (δ) ∧ q (δ) > q2 ≥ 0
}
Ω2 =
{
(q1, q2) |q (δ) > q1 ≥ 0 ∧ q (δ) > q2 ≥ q (δ)
}
Ω10 =
{
(q1, q2) |qM (δ) > q1 ≥ q (δ) ∧ q (δ) > q2 ≥ q (δ)
}
Ω3 =
{
(q1, q2) | q (δ) > q1 ≥ 0 ∧ qM (δ) > q2 ≥ q (δ)
}
Ω11 =
{
(q1, q2) |qM (δ) > q1 ≥ q (δ) ∧ qM (δ) > q2 ≥ q (δ)
}
Ω4 =
{
(q1, q2) |q (δ) > q1 ≥ 0 ∧ q2 ≥ qM (δ)
}
Ω12 =
{
(q1, q2) |qM (δ) > q1 ≥ q (δ) ∧ q2 ≥ qM (δ)
}
Ω5 =
{
(q1, q2) |q (δ) > q1 ≥ q (δ) ∧ q (δ) > q2 ≥ 0
}
Ω13 =
{
(q1, q2) | q1 ≥ qM (δ) ∧ q (δ) > q2 ≥ 0
}
Ω6 =
{
(q1, q2) |q (δ) > q1 ≥ q (δ) ∧ q (δ) > q2 ≥ q (δ)
}
Ω14 =
{
(q1, q2) |q1 ≥ qM (δ) ∧ q (δ) > q2 ≥ q (δ)
}
Ω7 =
{
(q1, q2) |q (δ) > q1 ≥ q (δ) ∧ qM (δ) > q2 ≥ q (δ)
}
Ω15 =
{
(q1, q2) |q1 ≥ qM (δ) ∧ qM (δ) > q2 ≥ q (δ)
}
Ω8 =
{
(q1, q2) |q (δ) > q1 ≥ q (δ) ∧ q2 ≥ qM (δ)
}
Ω16 =
{
(q1, q2) |q1 ≥ qM (δ) ∧ q2 ≥ qM (δ)
}
According to definition (22), (q∗1 , q
∗
2) is a robust-optimization equilibrium of our Cournot duopoly model if and only if
(q∗1 , q
∗
2) =
(
Rδ (q∗2) , R
δ (q∗1)
)
(66)
Then, a necessary condition for (q∗1 , q
∗
2) ∈ Ωi, with i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}, is
(
Rδ (q∗2) , R
δ (q∗1)
)
∈ Ωi. It follows that:
- There are no robust-optimization equilibria in Ω16. Indeed ∀ (q1, q2) ∈ Ω16, we have that
(
Rδ (q2) , R
δ (q1)
)
= (0, 0) /∈
Ω16;
- There are no robust-optimization equilibria in Ω15 ∪Ω14. Indeed ∀ (q1, q2) ∈ Ω15 ∪Ω14 we have
(
Rδ (q2) , R
δ (q1)
)
=(
Rδ (q2) , 0
)
/∈ Ω15 ∪Ω14. By symmetric arguments, the same holds true in Ω8 ∪ Ω12;
- There are no robust-optimization equilibria inΩ4. Indeed ∀ (q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) ∈ Ω4 the condition
(
Rδ (q∗2) , R
δ (q∗1)
)
=
(
0, Rδ (0)
)
∈
Ω4 impliesR
δ (0) ≥ qM (δ), or equivalently γ (δ) > 2b (δ) which contradicts Assumption 2. By symmetric arguments,
the same holds true in Ω13;
- There are no robust-optimization equilibria in Ω9. Indeed, solving (66) in Ω9 we obtain
q∗1 =
(
2b (δ)− γ (δ)
)
a
4b (δ) b (δ)− γ (δ) γ (δ)
and q∗2 =
(
2b (δ)− γ (δ)
)
a
4b (δ) b (δ)− γ (δ) γ (δ)
(67)
imposing (q∗1 , q
∗
2) ∈ Ω9 is equivalent to q
M (δ) > q∗1 ≥ q (δ) and q (δ) > q
∗
2 > 0, which implies(
2b (δ)− γ (δ)
) (
γ − γ
)
>
(
2b (δ)− γ (δ)
) (
b− b
)
and
(
2b (δ)− γ (δ)
) (
b− b
)
>
(
2b (δ)− γ (δ)
) (
γ − γ
)
(68)
where one condition contradicts the other one. By symmetric arguments, there are not robust-optimization equilibria in
Ω3.
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- There are no robust-optimization equilibria in Ω2. Indeed, solving (66) in Ω2 we obtain
q∗1 =
(
γ − γ
)
a
2b (δ)
(
b− b
)
+ γ (δ)
(
γ − γ
) and q∗2 = (b− b) a
2b (δ)
(
b− b
)
+ γ (δ)
(
γ − γ
) (69)
imposing (q∗1 , q
∗
2) ∈ Ω2 is equivalent to have q (δ) > q
∗
1 > 0 and q (δ) > q
∗
2 ≥ q (δ), which implies b − b > γ − γ
to have q∗2 > q
∗
1 and 2b (δ) < γ (δ) to have q
∗
2 ≥ q (δ). However, the latter condition violates Assumption 2, in fact
2b̂ (δ) > γ̂ (δ) implies 2b (δ)
Ä
> 2b̂ (δ) > γ̂ (δ)
ä
> γ (δ). By symmetric arguments, there are no robust-optimization
equilibria in Ω5.
In the reminder partitions of the state space of the game, robust-optimization equilibria exist under certain conditions:
• Solving (66) in Ω1, we obtain q∗1 = q
∗
2 = q
ROE1 . Imposing
(
qROE1 , qROE1
)
∈ Ω1 is equivalent to q (δ) > qROE1 > 0
and it is satisfied if and only if b− b > γ − γ. Then
(
qROE1 , qROE1
)
is a robust-optimization equilibrium if and only if
the latter condition is satisfied.
• According to (66), a robust-optimization equilibrium in Ω6 implies
q∗1 =
γ − γ
b− b
q∗2 and q
∗
2 =
γ − γ
b− b
q∗1 (70)
Then, b− b = γ − γ and hence a continuum of robust-optimization equilibria exists and is given by{
(q∗1 , q
∗
2) | q (δ) > q
∗
1 ≥ q (δ) ∧ q (δ) > q
∗
2 ≥ q (δ)
}
(71)
where (71) is obtained imposing the feasibility condition (q∗1 , q
∗
2) ∈ Ω6, or there are no robust-optimization equilibria.
• Solving (66) in Ω11 under condition γ (δ) 6= 2b (δ), we obtain q∗1 = q
∗
2 = q
ROE2 . Imposing
(
qROE2 , qROE2
)
∈ Ω11,
we have that it is a robust-optimization equilibrium if and only if b− b < γ − γ. For γ (δ) = 2b (δ), solving (66) in Ω11
we obtain q∗1 =
a
2b(δ) − q
∗
2 . Therefore,
Ä
q, a−c2b(δ) − q
ä
∈ Ω11 are robust-optimization equilibria.
• Solving (22) in Ω7, we obtain q∗1 = q
ROE3 and q∗2 = q
ROE4 . Imposing
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
∈ Ω7, we have qM (δ) >
qROE4 ≥ q (δ) and q (δ) > qROE3 ≥ q (δ). The first condition is equivalent to γ − γ > b − b, which implies that the
second reduces to γ (δ) > 2b (δ). Then
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
is a robust-optimization equilibrium if and only if the latter two
conditions are both satisfied. By symmetric arguments,
(
qROE4 , qROE3
)
∈ Ω10 is a robust-optimization equilibrium if
and only if the latter two conditions hold.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. By assumption
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
is a robust-optimization equilibrium of the game, then γ− γ > b− b
and δ > δ∗ by Theorem 2. The first condition implies qROE4 > qROE3 , while the second condition is equivalent to γ (δ) >
2b (δ) and implies
ρδ
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
− ρδ
(
qROE4 , qROE3
)
= a
Ç
1−
b (δ)
(
b (δ) − b (δ)
)
+ b (δ)
(
γ (δ) − γ (δ)
)
2b (δ)
(
b (δ) − b (δ)
)
+ γ (δ)
(
γ (δ) − γ (δ)
)å (qROE3 − qROE4) < 0 (72)
The symmetry of the game completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. The existence of the three robust-optimization equilibria implies γ − γ > b − b and δ ∈ (δ∗, 1] (or
equivalently γ (δ) > 2b (δ)), from which it follows that qROE4 > qROE2 > qROE3 . Moreover, we have
ρδ
(
qROE2 , qROE2
)
= b
(
qROE2
)2
ρδ
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
= b
(
qROE3
)2
(73)
and
ρδ
(
qROE4 , qROE3
)
=
(2b− γ)
(
b− b
)
+ (γ − b)
(
γ − γ
)
γ − γ
(
qROE4
)2
(74)
for all δ ∈ [δ∗, 1]. Therefore,
ρδ
(
qROE2 , qROE2
)
− ρδ
(
qROE3 , qROE4
)
= b
(
qROE2 − qROE3
) (
qROE2 + qROE3
)
> 0 (75)
26
and
ρδ
(
qROE4 , qROE3
)
− ρδ
(
qROE2 , qROE2
)
> b
(
qROE4 − qROE2
) (
qROE4 + qROE2
)
> 0 (76)
which proves the Proposition.
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